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DUELING NATIONALITIES: DUAL CITIZENSHIP,
DOMINANT AND EFFECTIVE NATIONALITY, AND THE
CASE OF ANWAR AL-AULAQI
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. government ended a two-year manhunt in September 2011 when
armed drones operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) “crossed
into northern Yemen and unleashed a barrage of Hellfire missiles” at a car
carrying, among others, Anwar al-Aulaqi (also spelled “al-Awlaki”1)—a dual
U.S.–Yemeni citizen.2 Formerly a moderately religious Muslim, al-Aulaqi had
become a leader for radical Muslims abroad over the past decade, inspiring
jihadist attacks against the West and playing an increasing role in the
operations and planning of attacks by al Qaeda’s affiliate organization based in
Yemen. Al-Aulaqi was born in the United States to Yemeni parents in 1971,
lived in Yemen from 1978 to 1991, returned to the United States to study and
work in 1991, and left the United States permanently in 2002, returning to live
in Yemen in 2004. In early 2010, the Obama Administration took the
“extraordinary step” of promoting the targeted killing of an individual with
U.S. citizenship by authorizing the CIA and U.S. military to capture or kill alAulaqi.3 Later that year, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder suggested that alAulaqi “should be on the same most-dangerous list as Osama bin Laden,”4 and
New York Police Department counterterrorism officials labeled al-Aulaqi, not
bin Laden, as “the most dangerous man in the world.”5

1

See, e.g., Evan Perez, Suit Challenges Reach of U.S. ‘Targeted Killings,’ WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704323704575462030737701908.html.
2 Mark Mazzetti et al., Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html.
3 Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of American Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, at A12.
4 Geoff Earle & Andy Soltis, The Enemy Within: AG Sounds Alarm on Homegrown Terror, N.Y. POST
(Dec. 22, 2010, 2:00 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/national/the_enemy_within_FVSBheZuXxZzzn
bj3xRrwI.
5 Matthew Cole & Aaron Katersky, Awlaki: ‘The Most Dangerous Man in the World,’ ABC NEWS
(Nov. 10, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/awlaki-dangerous-man-world/story?id=12109217. Indeed,
only days after bin Laden was killed by a team of U.S. Navy Seals in May 2011, a U.S. strike nearly succeeded
in killing al-Aulaqi. Martha Raddatz & Luis Martinez, Anwar al-Awlaki Targeted by U.S. Drones, ABC NEWS
(May 6, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/anwar-al-awlaki-targeted-us-drones-osama-bin/story?id=
13549218.
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The United States has, on occasion, killed U.S. citizens involved in conflict
in the Middle East.6 In 2002, for example, Ahmed Hijazi, an American
citizen,7 was killed when a U.S. Predator drone fired a missile at a car in
Yemen, killing six men—all suspected al Qaeda operatives.8 The targeted
individual, however, was Abu Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harithi, an al Qaeda leader
allegedly responsible for the USS Cole bombing.9 The addition of al-Aulaqi to
the U.S. government’s “hit-list” represented the first time in this post-9/11
conflict that a person with U.S. citizenship was specifically targeted.10
Al-Aulaqi’s death made waves among news media, politicians, and law
professors, sparking national debate over the legality of killing an individual
with American citizenship.11 For its part, the Obama Administration defended
the strike, claiming that an internal review—involving senior lawyers from
across the administration—determined that the killing of al-Aulaqi was legal.12

6

See, e.g., U.S. Defends Yemen Strike, BBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2002, 10:50 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/americas/2439305.stm.
7 Hijazi, in fact, held dual citizenship with the United States and “an unidentified Middle Eastern
country . . . . He was not born in the United States, but resided here for an unknown period of time.” Dana
Priest, CIA Killed U.S. Citizen in Yemen Missile Strike: Action’s Legality, Effectiveness Questioned, WASH.
POST, Nov. 8, 2002, at A1. Though it was widely reported that Hijazi was an American citizen, it is possible
that he was not a dominant and effective American national.
8 Id.
9 Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Study on Targeted Killings, at 7, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Rep. of the Special Rapporteur]; Priest,
supra note 7.
10 Shane, supra note 3; Catherine Herridge, EXCLUSIVE: Al Qaeda Leader Dined at the Pentagon Just
Months After 9/11, FOX NEWS (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/10/20/al-qaeda-terror-leaderdined-pentagon-months. But see Dana Priest, U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding
Yemen on Strikes, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/
01/26/AR2010012604239.html (“The [targeted killing] list includes three Americans, including Aulaqi, whose
name was added late last year. As of several months ago, the CIA list included three U.S. citizens, and an
intelligence official said that Aulaqi’s name has now been added.”).
11 See, e.g., Michael Martinez, U.S. Drone Killing of American al-Awlaki Prompts Legal, Moral Debate,
CNN (Sept. 30, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-30/politics/politics_targeting-us-citizens_1_al-awlakiyemeni-embassy-drone-missile. For example, U.S. Representative Ron Paul denounced President Obama for
“assassinating” al-Aulaqi, while U.S. Representative Peter King, former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, and
former U.S. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich applauded the strike and insisted that it was legal. Wolf
Blitzer, BLITZER’S BLOG: Impeach Obama? Ron Paul, Newt Gingrich Disagree, CNN (Oct. 6, 2011, 4:04
PM),
http://situationroom.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/06/blitzers-blog-impeach-obama-ron-paul-newt-gingrichdisagree; Martinez, supra.
12 Peter Finn, Secret U.S. Memo Sanctioned Killing of Aulaqi, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/aulaqi-killing-reignites-debate-on-limits-of-executive-power/
2011/09/30/gIQAx1bUAL_story.html.
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This controversy, however, was not entirely new; in fact, the U.S.
government’s targeting of al-Aulaqi was challenged in a domestic court just
one year earlier. Al-Aulaqi’s father, with help from two civil liberties groups,13
filed a lawsuit in federal court for the District of Columbia as “next friend” of
his son in August 2010, challenging the legality of the Obama
Administration’s targeting of al-Aulaqi.14 The suit raised several issues, some
of which fall outside of the scope of this Comment,15 in an attempt to block the
United States from targeting al-Aulaqi.16 The thrust of the plaintiff’s argument,
however, lay in the fact that the U.S. government was targeting a person with
U.S. citizenship without affording him due process or other constitutional
protections typically afforded to citizens.17 The plaintiff argued that “the
question was whether the government has the power to kill any American
citizen it labels as a terrorist without review by the courts.”18
Modern theory of citizenship is premised on the idea that citizens accept
certain duties and give up certain freedoms, and in return, government is
instituted to secure for citizens their fundamental rights.19 This understanding
of “reciprocal” rights and duties is heavily grounded in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century theories of social contract;20 and to this day, the U.S.

13

The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the Center for Constitutional Rights (“CCR”).
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (2010); Perez, supra note 1.
15 For example, plaintiff argued that the United States could not target any person for killing within
Yemen, regardless of citizenship, because at the time of filing, the United States was not in “armed conflict”
with Yemen or Yemeni groups. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 9; Perez, supra note 1. The plaintiff
distinguished conflict in Yemen from that of the United States’ wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: “The expansion
would exceed the legal limits of the program, the civil-liberties groups say. Jameel Jaffer, director of the
ACLU’s National Security Project [and lead lawyer for plaintiff], said ‘Yemen is not Afghanistan or Iraq. The
legal limits on the authority they claim hasn’t been specified.’” Perez, supra note 1. In addition, the plaintiff
sought “an injunction ordering defendants to disclose the criteria that the United States uses to determine
whether a U.S. citizen will be targeted for killing.” Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
16 Perez, supra note 1.
17 Scott Shane & Robert W. Worth, Challenge Heard on Move To Kill Qaeda-Linked Cleric, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2010, at A12.
18 Id.
19 Timothy A. Canova, Democracy’s Disappearing Duties: The Washington Consensus and the Limits of
Citizen Participation, in DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND WAR 199 (Yoav Peled et al. eds., 2011).
20 Id.; see also, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996)
(1651); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988)
(1689); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Putnam 1968)
(1762). For example, Thomas Hobbes believed that in the absence of political authority, humans would live in
a state of nature and constant war with all other men, where the life of man would be “solitary, poore [sic],
nasty, brutish, and short”; to avoid this dark fate, Hobbes writes, the free man must establish a civil society
through a social contract in which each gains civil rights in return for subjecting himself to civil law. HOBBES,
supra, at 84, 96. However, perhaps in contradiction to contemporary understandings of citizenship, Hobbes
14
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government provides naturalization candidates with a document enumerating
some of the reciprocal duties and rights that come with U.S. citizenship.21
One problem inherent to matters of citizenship is that each state is free to
choose the basis on which it will confer citizenship on individuals;22 and in
most cases, a state allows individuals to acquire citizenship through any one of
several avenues.23 The inescapable result is that two (or more) states may
simultaneously confer their nationality on the same individual.24 A person may
acquire citizenship of one country by virtue of being born on its soil, while
simultaneously acquiring citizenship of a second country through the
citizenship of her parents.25 A person may be born a citizen of one country, and
may later acquire citizenship of a second country through marriage.26 And so
on.
Customary international law has long recognized the anomaly of dual
citizenship. In doing so, however, international tribunals have been faced with
problems that arise when an individual’s dual set of rights or dual set of duties
ultimately uses this underlying premise to advocate that citizens should submit to absolute authority of their
sovereign to best attain a civil society. Id. at 519–22.
As another example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau detailed a model of citizenship in which men assume
certain duties for the betterment of all; in exchange for giving up unlimited freedom, men gain civil liberties
and the protection of their property rights. ROUSSEAU, supra, at 19 (“What man loses by the social contract is
his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything . . . what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship
of all he possesses.”). Rousseau writes, “The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and
protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting
himself with all, may still obey himself alone and remain as free as before.” Id. at 14. This is the problem for
“which the Social Contract provides the solution.” Id. The social contract “tacitly includes the undertaking . . .
that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body.” Id. at 18.
It is arguable that a version of social contract theory may be found in writings as far back as Plato’s
Crito. See Canova, supra note 19.
21 Citizenship Rights and Responsibilities, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.
uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.749cabd81f5ffc8fba713d10526e0aa0/?vgnextoid=39d2df6bdd42a210Vg
nVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=39d2df6bdd42a210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2011).
22 See Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era: The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Note, 83
MICH. L. REV. 597, 601 (1984) [hereinafter Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era].
23 Citizenship, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.
eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=a2ec6811264a3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgn
extchannel=a2ec6811264a3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
24 Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era, supra note 22, at 601.
25 US State Department Services Dual Nationality, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_
pa_tw/cis/cis_1753.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
26 Under the laws of some states, marriage automatically confers citizenship on a foreigner, while in
other states, marriage simply puts a foreigner on a fast-track to naturalization. INVESTIGATIONS SERV., U.S.
OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE WORLD (2001), available at http://www.opm.gov/extra/
investigate/is-01.pdf.
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conflict.27 To deal with these legal difficulties, customary international law
precedent dictates that when hearing a case in which an individual’s citizenship
has bearing either on jurisdiction to hear the case or on the merits of the claim
itself, a tribunal must first determine, as a threshold matter, the individual’s
“dominant and effective” nationality.28 Only after determining the individual’s
dominant nationality should a tribunal proceed to the merits of the case.
In Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, the court ultimately threw out the suit on
procedural grounds, holding that al-Aulaqi’s father lacked standing to file the
lawsuit on behalf of his son.29 In addition, the court held that “[e]ven if
plaintiff [had] standing to bring his constitutional claims . . . his claims should
still be dismissed because they raise non-justiciable political questions.”30 The
end result of the case—namely, its dismissal—may well have been the correct
one, even if the case had been decided on the merits of the claim. But had the
case not been dismissed on procedural grounds, what then? A reading of the
court’s opinion suggests that the parties and the court took for granted the
fundamental assumption that al-Aulaqi was, in fact, entitled to the full
protections of U.S. citizenship.31
Before assuming that al-Aulaqi should be afforded the rights granted to
American citizens, the court should have followed customary international law
by first determining al-Aulaqi’s dominant and effective nationality.
Essentially, if the court had made the threshold determination that al-Aulaqi
was a dominant and effective Yemeni national, why should he even have been
entitled to U.S. Constitutional protections?
27 The issue has come up most frequently through international claims tribunals, where a dual national
makes a claim against one of her states of citizenship, but has been brought before the International Court of
Justice and other tribunals, under various circumstances, as well. See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.),
1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
28 This practice has come to be known as the “doctrine of dominant and effective nationality.” DAVID J.
BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 89 (3d ed. 2010).
29 Charlie Savage, Suit over Targeted Killings Is Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2010, at A12. AlAulaqi’s father had neither standing himself, “next friend” standing, nor “third party” standing. Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 49 (2010).
30 Al-Aulaqi, 727. F. Supp. 2d at 65, 80; see also Savage, supra note 29 (noting the court’s holding that
“decisions about targeted killings in such circumstances were a ‘political question’ for executive branch
officials to make—not judges”). Interestingly, the court did not reach defendants’ invocation of the state
secrets privilege, “because plaintiff [lacked] standing and his claims [were] non-justiciable, and because the
state secrets privilege should not be invoked ‘more often or extensively than necessary.’” Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.
Supp. 2d at 83.
31 See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 2. Even CIA Director Leon Panetta seemed to take al-Aulaqi’s U.S.
citizenship for granted when quoted, in June 2010, as saying, “[al-Aulaqi] is a terrorist and yes, he’s a U.S.
citizen, but he is first and foremost a terrorist and we’re going to treat him like a terrorist.” Perez, supra note 1.
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Beyond al-Aulaqi’s case, the doctrine of dominant and effective nationality
should prove valuable to the United States in its continued fight against
terrorism, more generally. The U.S. government has been challenged at times
over the past decade to find legal support for its treatment of terror suspects,
particularly those who hold U.S. citizenship.32 Faced with a growing number
of homegrown terrorism suspects, many of whom hold dual nationality, the
U.S. government can use the doctrine of dominant and effective nationality to
its benefit by distinguishing dual nationals who hold dominant foreign
citizenship from those who, in fact, hold dominant U.S. citizenship.
This Comment argues that when hearing a case involving a suspected
terrorist who holds dual citizenship, a domestic court33 should first determine,
as a threshold matter, the dominant and effective nationality of the accused.
This determination is significant because a dominant foreign national can
essentially be treated as a non-citizen, for the purposes of adjudication, and
may not be entitled to the full rights and protections of domestic citizenship. In
Part I, this Comment provides a brief background on the practice of targeted
killing and the U.S. government’s basis for targeting al-Aulaqi. Part II explains
the development of the doctrine of dominant and effective nationality under
customary international law. Part III discusses the usefulness of applying the
doctrine in combating terrorism-related offenses, even beyond targeted killings
cases, particularly in dealing with threats and acts of homegrown terrorism
against the West. In addition, Part III forecasts some of the difficulties likely to
arise when applying the doctrine in cases where the target or detainee holds
dual citizenship. Finally, Part IV looks at the al-Aulaqi affair as an illustrative
case study, applying the doctrine to determine al-Aulaqi’s dominant and
effective nationality.

32

Dawud Walid, Editorial, U.S.-Born Terror Suspects Deserve Legal Due Process and Open Trials,
DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 12, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www.detnews.com/article/20111012/OPINION01/
110120313/1008/opinion01/U.S.-born-terror-suspects-deserve-legal-due-process-and-open-trials.
33 This Comment places emphasis on domestic courts of the United States; but because the doctrine of
dominant and effective nationality is a part of customary international law, the doctrine could just as rightly be
applied by the domestic courts of any other nation.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Background on Targeted Killings
The term “targeted killing” is typically used to describe the intentional,
direct targeting of a person using lethal force intended to cause death.34
Generally, “international law permits the use of lethal force against
individuals . . . that pose an imminent threat to a country,”35 and in the case of
the United States, “Congress [explicitly] approved the use of military force
against Al Qaeda after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.”36 Although the
United States has had an official ban on political assassination since the
presidency of Gerald Ford,37 the U.S. government maintains that individuals on
the “target list” are considered to be “military enemies of the United States”
and not subject to the ban on assassination.38 This Comment does not purport
to take a position on the legality of the United States’ targeted killing program
in the war on terror, but a summary of the general arguments for and against its
legality provides a meaningful context in understanding the debate over the
United States’ specific targeting of al-Aulaqi.

34 Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law 9 (Brooking Inst. et
al., Working Paper No. 9, 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0511_
counterterrorism_anderson/0511_counterterrorism_anderson.pdf [hereinafter Anderson, Targeted Killing in
U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law]. However, the term is not a “generally defined legal term in
domestic or international law.” Id.; see also Kenneth Anderson, Predators over Pakistan, WKLY. STANDARD,
Mar. 8, 2010, at 26, 34 [hereinafter Anderson, Predators over Pakistan]. An alternative definition may be a
“premeditated killing by a state of a specifically identified person not in its custody.” Richard Murphy & John
Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 406 (2010).
35 U.N. Charter art. 51; Shane, supra note 3.
36 Priest, supra note 7; Shane, supra note 3.
37 U.S. Policy on Assassinations, CNN (Nov. 4, 2002), http://articles.cnn.com/2002-11-04/justice/us.
assassination.policy_1_assassination-prohibition-cia-lawyers. Customary international law also has a longstanding history of banning political assassination. JASON D. SÖDERBLOM, WORLD INT’L CMTY. EXPERTS GRP.,
TIME TO KILL? STATE SPONSORED ASSASSINATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (2004), available at http://
world-ice.com/Articles/Assassinations.pdf.
38 Shane, supra note 3. In a May 2010 article, Scott Shane reported:

In the fullest administration statement to date, Harold Koh, the State Department’s legal adviser,
said in a March 24 speech the drone strikes against Al Qaeda and its allies were lawful as part of
the military action authorized by Congress after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, as well as under the
general principle of self-defense. By those rules, he said, such targeted killing was not
assassination, which is banned by executive order.
Scott Shane, A Legal Debate as C.I.A. Stalks a U.S. Jihadist, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2010, at A1 [hereinafter
Shane, A Legal Debate].
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Much of the difficulty in determining the legality of targeted killing stems
from the fact that the underlying context for the killings deviates from
antiquated standards of armed conflict under international law. The Geneva
Conventions “recognize only two types of armed conflict: an international
armed conflict, which takes place between two states, and an internal armed
conflict, a civil war taking place within the territory of a single state.”39 Some
observers argue that because the United States’ aggression against al Qaeda,
for example, falls under neither of the established categories of “armed
conflict,”40 the conflict, generally, should be governed by law-enforcement
standards.41 Others argue that the laws of armed conflict should still control in
the fight against al Qaeda because the scope and scale of the attacks on
September 11, 2001, made them an act of war.42 In “a traditional war, anyone
allied with the enemy, regardless of citizenship is a legitimate target; GermanAmericans who fought with the Nazis in World War II were given no special
treatment.”43
Similarly, observers disagree over whether the U.S. government’s current
targeting practices, in particular, violate international law standards. Those
supportive of the practice believe that the United States’ use of targeted
killings abroad, even within nations with which the United States is not
engaged in formal war, falls under “the traditional American legal view of
‘self-defense’ in international law.”44 The self-defense theory is grounded in
Article 51 of the United Nations (“UN”) Charter, which arguably permits
anticipatory self-defense,45 and in U.S. doctrinal law, which has interpreted
39 Anthony Dworkin, The Yemen Strike: The War on Terrorism Goes Global, CRIMES WAR PROJECT
(Nov. 14, 2002), http://www.mafhoum.com/press4/122P7.htm.
40 The United States’ battle with al Qaeda and other terrorist groups is not a conflict that takes place
“between two states,” because none of the terrorist groups is a “state,” nor can the fight be classified as an
internal conflict because the majority of the alleged terrorists are not citizens of the United States and the
majority of the fighting has not occurred within the borders of any one state.
41 Dworkin, supra note 39; Mary Ellen O’Connell, Killing Awlaki Was Illegal, Immoral and Dangerous,
CNN (Oct. 1, 2011), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/01/killing-awlaki-was-illegal-immoraland-dangerous.
42 Dworkin, supra note 39.
43 Shane, A Legal Debate, supra note 38.
44 Anderson, Predators over Pakistan, supra note 34, at 27.
45 Article 51 states that nothing in the UN Charter shall “impair the inherent right of individual . . . selfdefence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 51. Kenneth
Anderson, for one, argues that “in the long-standing U.S. view, self-defense encompasses at least three
categories: ‘[s]elf-defense against an actual use of force or hostile act;’ ‘[p]reemptive self defense against an
imminent use of force;’ and ‘[s]elf defense against a continuing threat.’” Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S.
Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, supra note 34, at 18–19. In support, Anderson cites to a memorandum on
assassinations produced in 1989 by Senior Department of Defense law of war lawyer Hays Parks. Id. at 19–20
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international custom to allow for “anticipatory self-defense.”46 Those opposed
to the government’s current practice argue that targeted killings violate
international law standards, at least when performed where actual armed
conflicts are not occurring, or where the United States is not a party to the
armed conflict.47 Rather, they claim that international standards for law
enforcement, which do not allow for anticipatory self-defense,48 should apply
to killings outside of armed conflict zones.49
The U.S. Supreme Court has not examined the legality of a government’s
targeted killing program, but Israel’s Supreme Court sitting as the High Court
of Justice recently tackled the issue.50 In Public Committee Against Torture in
Israel v. Israel, petitioners argued that Israel’s practice of targeted killings,
even in response to the Second Intifada, was “totally illegal and contradictory
to international law, Israeli law, and basic principles of human morality” under
international rules of law enforcement.51 Respondents argued that because of
the continuing “acts of combat and terrorism being committed against Israel,”
Israel’s policy was legal under international laws of armed conflict.52 The
Israeli Supreme Court recognized the complexities of the issue before it,53 but
ultimately sided with the respondents and chose to apply the laws of armed

(citing Memorandum, Hays Parks, Executive Order 12333 and Assassination 4, 7 (Nov. 2, 1989), available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Use%20of%20Force/October%202002/Parks_final.pdf).
46 Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, supra note 34, at 19 (“The
United States grounds its customary law views concerning anticipatory self-defense on the so-called Caroline
Doctrine, which permits such actions but also limits them to circumstances in which the ‘necessity of selfdefense is instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.’”).
47 Lawful Use of Combat Drones: Hearing on Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of
Unmanned Targeting Before the H. Comm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 20 (2010)
(statement of Mary Ellen O’Connell, Professor, Notre Dame Univ.) [hereinafter Lawful Use of Combat
Drones]. For example, on November 3, 2002, “the CIA used a drone to fire laser-guided Hellfire missiles at a
passenger vehicle traveling in a thinly populated region of Yemen,” killing all six passengers. Id. at 21.
O’Connell argues that “the strike constituted a clear case of extrajudicial killing” because there was no armed
conflict in Yemen at the time. Id.
48 The United Nations’ Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials states that “intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to
protect life.” Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,
Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials, ch. I.B.2, Annex, at 114, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.144/28/Rev.1 (1991).
49 Lawful Use of Combat Drones, supra note 47, at 2; Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Choice of Law Against
Terrorism, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 343, 362 (2010).
50 See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [2005], http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_
eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf (English translation).
51 Id. paras. 3, 4.
52 Id. para. 10.
53 Id. para. 60.
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conflict.54 The court did charge that before the Israeli Defense Forces may
target an individual, an independent, intraexecutive investigation must first
balance the individual’s civil liberties with the needs of national security;55 but
significantly, the court held that the Israeli government’s use of targeted killing
is not inherently illegal under international law.56
Again, this Comment does not purport to take a position on the legality of
the United States’ targeted killing program in the war on terror, but simply
recognizes that the United States has run such a program for much of the past
decade. Though it is unprecedented for an individual with U.S. citizenship to
be approved for targeted killing,57 the United States has engaged in the practice
of targeting particular individuals abroad as a key tool in its “War on Terror.”58
And for its part, the U.S. government insists that its use of targeted killings
does not violate international law; in March 2010, the legal advisor to the U.S.
Department of State, Harold Koh, claimed that the United States’ targeting
practices “comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war.”59 There
is reason to believe that the United States will continue to target certain
individuals for the foreseeable future.60
B. Reasons for the United States’ Targeting of al-Aulaqi
In recent years, Anwar al-Aulaqi had “emerged as an eloquent and
unapologetic advocate of violence against the West. His online sermons attract
54 Id. para. 18 (citing A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (2d ed. 2005) (“An armed conflict which
takes place between an Occupying Power and rebel or insurgent groups—whether or not they are terrorist in
character—in an occupied territory, amounts to an international armed conflict.”)).
55 Id. para. 63; Murphy & Radsan, supra note 34, at 450.
56 Anthony Dworkin, Israel’s High Court on Targeted Killing: A Model for the War on Terror?, CRIMES
WAR PROJECT (Dec. 15, 2006), http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-highcourt.html. The court defined
“targeted killings” as “the preventative strike causing the deaths of terrorists, and at times also of innocent
civilians.” HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr., para. 60.
57 Shane, supra note 3.
58 See, e.g., Rep. of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 9; Anderson, Predators over Pakistan, supra note
34, at 26 (“The Predator drone strategy is a rare example of something that has gone really, really well for the
Obama administration.”); CNN Wire Staff, U.S. Is World’s Top User of Targeted Killings, U.N. Says, CNN
(June 2, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-02/us/un.targeted.killings.report_1_drone-attacks-killingspakistan. This is despite the fact that the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, “No person,” rather
than citizen, “shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST.
amend. V (emphasis added).
59 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010).
60 However, this Author recognizes that in a greater context, legal justification does matter, “partly for
reasons of legitimacy and partly because the United States is, and wants to be, a polity governed by law.”
Anderson, Predators over Pakistan, supra note 34, at 29.

KANNOF GALLEYSFINAL2.DOC

2011]

3/21/2012 8:16 AM

DUELING NATIONALITIES

1381

wide international audiences and are a source of particular concern to U.S.
authorities because they are delivered in English.”61 Observers have described
al-Aulaqi as “a leading light among militant Sunni preachers seeking to reach
out to English-speaking Muslims and encourage them to engage in jihad in the
West.”62 Until his death, al-Aulaqi maintained a website devoted to the
“glories of jihad,” through which users were able to email him with
questions.63 He frequently posted sermons online, easily accessible to
audiences worldwide through personal web pages of his supporters and
through popular commercial websites, such as YouTube.64 U.S. officials
believe that al-Aulaqi’s rhetoric has inspired more than a dozen terrorist
plots.65
Al-Aulaqi has been specifically linked to several terrorists and terrorist
plots, spanning nearly a decade, against the United States. The 9/11
Commission Report, released in 2004, “found that [two] Saudi Arabians who
helped hijack and fly American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon . . . had
made contact with [al-Aulaqi], then prayer leader at the Rabat mosque in the
San Diego suburb of La Mesa, soon after they moved to San Diego in February
2000”;66 al-Aulaqi is also suspected to have met with the same two hijackers at
his mosque in Virginia shortly before the 9/11 attacks.67 His writings “have
61 Greg Miller & Spencer S. Hsu, Muslim Cleric Tied to Bomb Attempt, WASH. POST, July 1, 2010, at
A9. For a discussion on al-Aulaqi’s evolution from a relatively moderate student of Islam during his college
days in Colorado in the early 1990s, to a radical preacher seeking war against the United States and its allies
by the time he fled to Yemen in the mid-2000s, see Sudarsan Raghavan, Cleric Linked to Fort Hood Attack
Grew More Radicalized in Yemen, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2009, at A15; Scott Shane & Souad Mekhennet,
From Condemning Terror to Preaching Jihad, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at A1.
62 Dan Murphy, Fort Hood Shooting: Was Nidal Malik Hasan Inspired by Militant Cleric?, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2009/1110/fort-hoodshooting-was-nidal-malik-hasan-inspired-by-militant-cleric. For example, al-Aulaqi has “authored a treatise
urging Muslims to violence called the ‘44 Ways to Support Jihad.’” Id.
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., Anwar Al Awlaki, The Battle of Hearts and Minds, YOUTUBE (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=G_T2I6mEGqc.
65 Shane, A Legal Debate, supra note 38. In addition, al-Aulaqi was accused of other terrorism-related
offenses, distinct from the allegations based on his rhetoric. For example, he had been accused of using a U.S.based Islamic charity to send money to terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and Hamas. See Murphy, supra
note 62.
66 Murphy, supra note 62; see also THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 221 (2004).
67 James Gordon Meek, Fort Hood Gunman Nadal Hasan “Is a Hero”: Imam Who Preached to 9/11
Hijackers in Va. Praises Attack, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 9, 2009), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-1109/news/17938669_1_awlaki-nidal-hasan-al-qaeda. Although there has been no direct evidence of al-Aulaqi’s
involvement in the 9/11 attacks, one FBI agent has suggested that “if anyone had knowledge of the plot, it
would have been [al-Aulaqi, since] someone had to be in the [United States] and keep the hijackers spiritually
focused.” Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61. Additionally, “the 9/11 commission staff members themselves
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been found on the computers of British, U.S., and Canadian terror suspects in
recent years, among them the New Jersey men accused of plotting an attack
against Fort Dix in 2007.”68
Media outlets and government officials report that al-Aulaqi was a driving
force behind several of the most serious radical Muslim attacks, and attempted
attacks, within the United States in the past couple of years. He held significant
ties with U.S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, who murdered thirteen soldiers
and wounded thirty-two others in a shooting rampage in November 2009 at
Texas’ Fort Hood.69 Following the attack, it was widely reported that Hasan,
mimicking the rhetoric of al-Aulaqi, “had espoused the belief that America’s
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were wars against all Muslims.”70 U.S. officials
believe that al-Aulaqi “had a direct operational role” in the attempted bombing
of a Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas Day of 2009.71 Officials believe that
al-Aulaqi put the would-be bomber—a Nigerian man named Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab—in touch with members of al Qaeda’s Yemeni offshoot, al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”), who then trained him;72 had it
succeeded, the attack could have killed more than 300 people.73 Al-Aulaqi
reportedly influenced Faisal Shahzad, the naturalized American citizen who
attempted to detonate a bomb in Times Square in May 2010.74 As was the case
had sharp arguments” about al-Aulaqi. Id. One staff member told reporters, “Do I think he played a role in
helping the hijackers here, knowing they were up to something? Yes. Do I think he was sent here for that
purpose? I have no evidence for it.” Id.
68 Murphy, supra note 62. In May 2007, six would-be terrorists—“immigrants from Jordan, Turkey and
the former Yugoslavia who came together because of a shared infatuation with Internet images of jihad”—
were “charged with conspiring to attack Fort Dix and kill soldiers there with assault rifles and grenades.” Dale
Russakoff & Dan Eggen, Six Charged in Plot To Attack Fort Dix, WASH. POST, May 9, 2007, at A1.
69 Murphy, supra note 62; see also Shane, supra note 3. Hasan reportedly attended services at the Dar alHijrah mosque in Virginia in 2001, at a time when al-Aulaqi served as its imam; and prior to Hasan’s 2009
attack, he and al-Aulaqi exchanged ten to twenty “communications,” in which Hasan asked al-Aulaqi for
spiritual guidance regarding violence. Meek, supra note 67.
70 James C. McKinley, Jr., Major Held in Fort Hood Rampage Is Charged with 13 Counts of Murder,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, at A14. In the wake of Hasan’s attack, al-Aulaqi wrote online, “Nidal Hassan is a
hero. He is a man of conscience who could not bear living the contradiction of being a Muslim and serving in
an army that is fighting against his own people.” Meek, supra note 67.
71 Miller & Hsu, supra note 61. The failed plot “employed a would-be suicide bomber . . . accused of
boarding the flight with explosives in his underwear.” Id. The would-be bomber was “subdued by other
passengers as he allegedly tried to detonate the bomb.” Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61; Damien McElroy, Times Square Bomb Suspect Had Links to
Terror Preacher, TELEGRAPH (May 7, 2010, 4:34 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
northamerica/usa/7691929/Times-Square-bomb-suspect-had-links-to-terror-preacher.html. Following his
arrest, Shahzad told interrogators that he had been “inspired to take up the cause of al Qaeda and radical Islam
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with Hasan, Abdulmutallab, and a number of others, Shahzad was in contact
with al-Aulaqi shortly before his attempted terrorist attack.75
Beyond mere rhetoric, U.S. officials believe that al-Aulaqi had, in recent
years, become increasingly involved with the operations of AQAP.76 While his
precise role in AQAP is unclear, U.S. officials believe he had “become
‘operational,’ plotting, not just inspiring, terrorism against the West.”77 In June
2010, AQAP released “a slick new English-language Web magazine” called
Inspire.78 Inspire is believed to be the work of two American citizens—Samir
Khan, a Saudi-born American who lived with his parents in New York before
fleeing to Yemen in 2007, and al-Aulaqi.79 Having released seven issues as of
September 2011,80 Inspire is “available as a download from an array of
websites” and aims to mobilize individuals “for violent jihad in their home
countries.”81 Al-Aulaqi is accused of connection to an October 2010 plot to
detonate bombs, hidden in mail parcels, on two airplanes.82 AQAP claimed
by the internet messages of [al-Aulaqi].” Id.; see also Richard Esposito et al., Sources: Shahzad Had Contact
with Awlaki, Taliban Chief, and Mumbai Massacre Mastermind, ABC NEWS (May 6, 2010), http://abcnews.
go.com/Blotter/faisal-shahzad-contact-awlaki-taliban-mumbai-massacre-mastermind/story?id=10575061.
75 NewsCore, Times Square Suspect Contacted Radical Cleric, MY FOX BOS. (May 6, 2010, 5:10 PM),
http://www.myfoxboston.com/dpps/news/times-square-suspect-contacted-radical-cleric-dpgonc-km-2010050
6_7411371.
76 Miller & Hsu, supra note 61. Indeed, shortly after al-Aulaqi was killed, President Obama remarked
that al-Aulaqi had taken “the lead role in planning and directing the efforts to murder innocent Americans,”
and that “[t]he death of Awlaki is a major blow to Al Qaeda’s most active operational affiliate.” Mazzetti et
al., supra note 2.
77 Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61. Government officials allege that al-Aulaqi acts as “a recruiter and
facilitator [for AQAP] who has a deep familiarity with U.S. cities and society.” Miller & Hsu, supra note 61.
However, “he is not . . . thought to have the skills to lead operations or build a bomb.” Id.
78 Judith Miller & David Samuels, A Glossy Approach to Inciting Terrorism, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2010,
at A2. The magazine, “whose title comes from a Koranic verse, ‘inspire the believers to fight,’ remixes oldschool jihadist tropes for an English-speaking Western audience raised on videogames and consumer
magazines.” Id.
79 Id. On September 30, 2011, Khan was killed in the same CIA strike that killed al-Aulaqi. Mark Schone
& Matthew Cole, American Jihadi Samir Khan Killed with Awlaki, ABC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/american-jihadi-samir-khan-killed-awlaki/story?id=14640013. However, Khan
was not directly targeted in the killing—the target was al-Aulaqi. Al Qaeda’s Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in
Yemen, CBS NEWS (Sept. 30, 2011, 5:02 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/09/30/501364/
main20113732.shtml.
80 INSPIRE, Fall 2011.
81 Miller & Samuels, supra note 78.
82 International authorities intercepted two mail parcels, one in Britain and the other in the United Arab
Emirates, containing bombs in October 2010. Yemen Mail Bomb “Could Have Detonated over Eastern U.S.,”
BBC NEWS [hereinafter Yemen Mail Bomb], http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11729720 (last
updated Nov. 10, 2010, 5:30 PM). The packages had originated from the Yemeni capital of Sanaa and were
sent through UPS and FedEx; the parcels were intercepted on cargo planes awaiting transport to the United
States. Id.; see also Yemen Puts Preacher al Awlaki on Trial in His Absence, REUTERS, Nov. 2, 2010,
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responsibility for the plot,83 and shortly afterwards, the editors of Inspire—
presumed to include Khan and al-Aulaqi—used its November 2010 issue to
encourage smaller-scale attacks on the West, boasting that “the recent effort to
bomb FedEx and UPS cargo planes . . . cost only $4,200.”84 Yemeni officials
have implicated al-Aulaqi in having been involved with or having “blessed the
recent mail bomb plot, though [he did not] necessarily [take] an active part in
it,”85 while some U.S. officials have gone so far as to suggest that al-Aulaqi
“master minded” the plot.86
II. FORMATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF DOMINANT AND EFFECTIVE
NATIONALITY UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
There are two key elements in the creation of a customary international law
rule.87 To convince the relevant decision-maker (whether it be an international
tribunal, domestic court, or government actor) that a rule has become
customary international law, one must show that the rule has (1) been followed
as a “general practice,” and (2) that the rule has been “accepted as law.”88
Once established as part of customary international law, a practice becomes
binding on states.89
The “general practice” element is an objective inquiry.90 Evidence that the
proponent of the practice might offer includes a showing that international
actors have followed the rule, that the practice has been consistent, and that the
practice has been followed for a sufficient period of time (though not

http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/middle-east/yemen-puts-preacher-al-awlaki-on-trial-in-hisabsence. When intercepted, the packages had already been transported by four planes—two of them passenger
jets—and authorities believe that the bombs were set to explode en route to the United States; the two
packages were addressed to synagogues in Chicago, Illinois. Mark Mazzetti et al., Bomb Plot Shows Key Role
Played by Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, at A1; Yemen Mail Bomb, supra.
83 Robert F. Worth, Yemen Judge Orders Arrest of Cleric Linked to al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010,
at A14; see also Shane & Worth, supra note 17.
84 Miller & Samuels, supra note 78.
85 Yemen Charges U.S.-Born Radical Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 2010),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-11-01-al-quaida-turncoat-alerted-saudis-to-plot_N.htm. But see
Jeralyn, Yemen Judge Orders Al Awlaki Arrest “by Any Means,” TALKLEFT (Nov. 6, 2010, 11:45 AM),
http://www.talkleft.com/story/2010/11/6/124536/723.
86 Earle & Soltis, supra note 4.
87 BEDERMAN, supra note 28, at 16.
88 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055 (noting that custom is
“evidence of a general practice accepted as law”); BEDERMAN, supra note 28, at 16.
89 BEDERMAN, supra note 28, at 16.
90 Id. at 17.
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necessarily a “long” time).91 To satisfy this element, one typically must look at
the conduct of states, as recorded in writing.92 For this reason, case decisions
issued by international tribunals are good places to find evidence of general
practice.
The “accepted as law” element demands a more subjective inquiry.93 It asks
“why an international actor has observed a particular practice,” which is known
as opinio juris.94 To satisfy this element, a proponent of a rule of custom may
demonstrate the reasonableness or utility of the rule.95 Although this element is
open to subjectivity, one typically demonstrates opinio juris through analyses
found in international tribunal decisions and through the writings of publicists
and international legal scholars.96
Where conflicting domestic laws or policies have led to disputes involving
international litigants, tribunals frequently have used customary international
law to fill the void.97 As has been noted, “matters of nationality are
regulated . . . by municipal, not international, law,” 98 and each state is free to
choose how and under what terms to confer citizenship on individuals.99 In the
United States a person obtains citizenship at birth by having been born on U.S.
soil (jus soli).100 Under certain circumstances, a person may acquire U.S.
citizenship at birth even on foreign soil, where one or both of her parents hold
U.S. citizenship (jus sanguinis).101 And of course, an individual may be
naturalized as a U.S. citizen.102 Britain distinguishes among six different forms

91

Id.
Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 See id.
97 See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (looking to rules of customary international law).
98 Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era, supra note 22, at 601.
99 See id.
100 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 732 (1998) (stating that a child born in the United
States of parents of foreign nationality but who are permanently located in the United States, may become a
U.S. citizen at the time of her birth by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution). The first
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Edward
J. Erler, American Citizenship and Postmodern Challenges, in EDWARD J. ERLER ET AL., THE FOUNDERS ON
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION: PRINCIPLES AND CHALLENGES IN AMERICA 67 (2007).
101 See Acquisition of U.S. Citizenship by a Child Born Abroad, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.
gov/law/citizenship/citizenship_5199.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
102 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION 3 (2011), available at
http://uscis.gov/files/articleM-476.pdf.
92
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of British nationality, and each form is acquired under different conditions.103
One way that Ireland, Israel, and Italy confer citizenship is through the “law of
return.”104 Many countries confer citizenship to a foreigner through
marriage.105 “The inevitable result of the absence of a uniform international
law to determine nationality is the anomaly of dual nationality: two states may
simultaneously confer their nationality on the same individual.”106
In dealing with international claims involving a dual national, customary
international law has seen the development of two competing doctrines: the
doctrine of state nonresponsibility and the doctrine of dominant and effective
nationality.107 The doctrine of state nonresponsibility recognizes that, in the
realm of international arbitration, either state of nationality is internally
competent to bring a claim on behalf of the dual national, but provides that
neither can present her claim against another state of which she is a national.108
In contrast, the doctrine of dominant and effective nationality provides that an
individual’s claim may be presented against a state that also regards her as a
citizen, as long as her connection to the claimant state predominates.109 In a
given situation, the competing doctrines may dictate opposite results.110

103 What Is British Citizenship?, U.K. BORDER AGENCY, http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/
britishcitizenship/aboutcitizenship (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
104 See Citizenship, DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=267 (last
visited Nov. 1, 2011) (Ir.) (explaining that applicants for Irish citizenship on the basis of an Irish grandparent
must provide proof of direct lineage in the form of birth and death certificates); Acquisition of Israeli
Nationality, ISR. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (Aug. 20, 2001), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_
2009/2001/8/Acquisition%20of%20Israeli%20Nationality (explaining that the Law of Return grants every Jew
the right to come to Israel and become an Israeli citizen); Italian Dual Citizenship Requirements, IT. DUAL
CITIZENSHIP, http://www.italiandualcitizenship.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
105 See, e.g., Citizenship, supra note 104; Naturalization for Spouses of U.S. Citizens, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIG. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?
vgnextoid=a0ffa3ac86aa3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=a0ffa3ac86aa3210VgnVCM1
00000b92ca60aRCRD (last updated Aug. 17, 2011).
106 Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era, supra note 22, at 601.
107 See, e.g., id. at 599.
108 The Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws art. 4,
opened for signature Apr. 12, 1930, 179 U.N.T.S. 89 (“A State may not afford diplomatic protection to one of
its nationals against a State whose nationality such person also possesses.”); Claims of Dual Nationals in the
Modern Era, supra note 22, at 599. At the time of the Hague Convention, a minority of states, including the
United States, proposed that “a qualification to the principle of absolute nonresponsibility be added precluding
protection only if the individual were ‘habitually resident’ in the ‘defendant state.’” Claims of Dual Nationals
in the Modern Era, supra note 22, at 599 n.10.
109 Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era, supra note 22, at 598–99.
110 Id. at 599. Under the doctrine of state nonresponsibility, a claim, perhaps otherwise justified, is
“rejected ipso facto because the individual also happens to be a national of the respondent country.” Id. In
contrast, the doctrine of dominant and effective nationality “favors allowing the individual an opportunity for
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State nonresponsibility is the older, more traditional of the two doctrines,
but its justifications “are anachronistic in the modern era and lead to the
conclusion that the traditional doctrine should be rejected as a statement of
international law.”111 The preferred standard, reflecting the modern trend,
favors the doctrine of dominant and effective nationality.112
A. Development of the Doctrine of “Dominant and Effective” Nationality in
Customary International Law
Though the theory of effective nationality emerged as early as 1834,113 the
law on treatment of dual nationals, at least those involved in international
claims arbitration, prior to World War II was uncertain—some precedent
favored nonresponsibility,114 while other precedent favored dominant and
effective nationality.115 In 1955, two key decisions—the Nottebohm Case and
the Mergé Claim—indicated a shift toward more uniform international
adoption of dominant and effective nationality.116
The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), in the Nottebohm Case,
demonstrated the acceptance and approval of the search for an individual’s
“real” and effective nationality based on the facts of the case.117 The ICJ
recognized that international arbitrators have given their preference to the real
and effective nationality of a person, and that different factors are taken into
consideration, including the habitual residence of the individual concerned, his
family ties, and his participation in public life.118 In the years since, several

redress if the facts indicate that he has a more substantial connection with the claimant state than with the
respondent state.” Id. at 599–600.
111 Id. at 602. For further discussion on problems with adopting the doctrine of nonresponsibility, see
Iran–United States, Case No. A/18, 5 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251 (1984); Claims of Dual Nationals in the
Modern Era, supra note 22, at 602–11.
112 See, e.g., Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era, supra note 22, at 624. For example, claims
tribunals have repeatedly used the dominant and effective nationality analysis. Id.
113 Id. at 611 n.66 (discussing the historic invocation of effective nationality).
114 See, e.g., Case No. A/18, 5 Iran–U.S Cl. Trib. Rep. 260 (discussing the 1930 Hague Convention’s
adoption of nonresponsibility).
115 Id. at 262–66.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 6). In Nottebohm, the ICJ examined the
authenticity of the claimant’s naturalization. The ICJ held that Nottebohm had sought naturalization “with the
sole aim of thus coming within the protection of Liechtenstein but not of becoming wedded to its traditions, its
interests, its way of life or of assuming the obligations . . . and exercising the rights pertaining to the status thus
acquired.” Id. at 26. There, “[t]he Court invoked the theory of nationality to declare the claim brought by the
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commentators have observed that “one can only satisfy the Nottebohm
standards of connections with a single nation.”119 In addition to showing the
ICJ’s interest in searching for the effective nationality of dual nationals,
Nottebohm shows an application of the doctrine in a context different from
those of the claims tribunals in which issues of dual nationality typically arise.
In that same year, the Mergé Claim gave the principal statement of the
doctrine of dominant and effective nationality.120 There, the Italian–U.S.
Conciliation Commission “looked to general principles of international law for
resolution to the issue of dual nationality,”121 finding that “the sovereign
equality of States . . . must yield before the principle of effective nationality
whenever such nationality is that of the claiming State.”122 The commission
established considerations by which an individual’s nationality would be
evaluated, including “habitual residence, . . . [t]he conduct of the individual in
his economic, social, political, civic and family life, as well as the closer and
more effective bond with one of the two States.”123 The commission applied
this same “link” analysis in several other similar cases involving dual
nationals,124 as did the Franco–Italian Conciliation Commission during the late
1950s.125
The dominant and effective nationality approach—articulated in
Nottebohm, Mergé, and subsequent cases—embodies the two fundamental
principles that bear on the contemporary view of a person’s nationality:
First, the concept of nationality embodies more than a tenuous legal
bond asserted by municipal law. Nationality, according to the
Government of Liechtenstein against the Government of Guatemala inadmissible.” Claims of Dual Nationals
in the Modern Era, supra note 22, at 615 n.93.
119 Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era, supra note 22, at 616, 616 n.97.
120 Id. at 611. There:
Mrs. Mergé was an American citizen by birth and an Italian citizen through marriage. The
Commission held that since Mrs. Mergé did not reside habitually in the United States and the
interests and the permanent professional life of her husband were established elsewhere, she
could not be regarded to be dominantly a U.S. national within the meaning and for the purpose of
[the relevant Treaty establishing the Commission].
Id. at 612 n.70; accord Mergé Case (U.S. v. It.), 14 R.I.A.A. 236 (It.–U.S. Conciliation Comm’n 1955).
121 Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era, supra note 22, at 611–12.
122 Mergé Case, 14 R.I.A.A. at 247.
123 Id.
124 Iran–United States, Case No. A/18, 5 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251, 263 (1984). Following the Mergé
Claim, “the Conciliation Commission admitted 11 of the 52 claimants with dual nationality.” Claims of Dual
Nationals in the Modern Era, supra note 22, at 612 n.71.
125 Case No. A/18, 5 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 263.
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International Court of Justice [in Nottebohm], is a “legal bond having
as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of
existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of
reciprocal rights and duties.” It is, by nature, incapable of division
between two or more states. Second, nationality is a product of
personal choice and action. The conduct of the individual furnishes
the only sound juridical foundation for recognition of a single
126
nationality.

In the years following Nottebohm and Mergé, customary international law has
dictated that arbitral tribunals tasked with resolving the conflict of dual
nationality look to those factors indicating a “genuine link” to one country
more than the other.127
B. Contributions of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal to the Doctrine of
Dominant and Effective Nationality
The most recent, and perhaps most significant, example of a modern
tribunal using this approach is that of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal
(“Claims Tribunal”), which was established as a direct result of the Islamic
Revolution and resolution to the Iran Hostage Crisis.128 The Islamic
Revolution, culminating with the proclamation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
in February 1979, disrupted many American businesses involved in projects
within Iran.129 As the revolution advanced, contracts “with various United
States business interests were terminated . . . assets in Iran were confiscated or
abandoned . . . [and] virtually all of the Americans who had been living in Iran
departed . . . frequently [leaving] personal belongings and important
documents behind.”130 Events reached a climax on November 4, 1979, when
Iranian protestors stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking embassy
personnel hostage.131 In response, “President Jimmy Carter issued . . . a series
of orders freezing all Iranian assets subject to the jurisdiction of the United

126 Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era, supra note 22, at 613 (quoting Nottebohm Case (Liech.
v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6)).
127 Id. at 613–14; see also WAYNE MAPP, THE IRAN–UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: THE FIRST TEN
YEARS, 1981–1991, at 62–69 (1993); David J. Bederman, Nationality of Individual Claimants Before the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal, 42 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 119, 124 n.32 (1993).
128 See, e.g., BEDERMAN, supra note 28, at 253.
129 CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN–UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 4
(1998).
130 Id.
131 Id.
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States.”132 “American individuals, companies and banks that had suffered
losses in Iran [then] rushed into court to obtain judicial attachments of Iranian
property in the United States.”133 Generally, these lawsuits were unable to
advance because “the United States Department of Justice requested that no
action be taken pending resolution of the hostage crisis.”134
The hostage crisis dragged on for 444 days, until Iran and the United States
reached the settlement agreement that came to be known as the “Algiers
Accords.”135 As part of the Algiers Accords, the two governments agreed to
“establish an arbitral body—the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal— . . . to
hear and adjudicate claims by United States nationals against Iran, claims by
Iranian nationals against the United States Government, and those between the
two Governments.”136
1. The Dominant and Effective Test
The question of how to treat dual nationals created controversy because the
Algiers Accords provided jurisdiction only for claims by U.S. nationals against
Iran or for Iranian nationals against the United States; the Accords were silent
as to treatment of Iranian–U.S. dual nationals.137 The Claims Tribunal (sitting
in full) ultimately invoked the doctrine of dominant and effective nationality,
holding in Case No. A/18 (“A/18 Decision”) that the Claims Tribunal had
jurisdiction over claims against Iran by Iranian–U.S. dual nationals “when the
dominant and effective nationality of the claimant during the relevant
period . . . was that of the United States.”138 In its opinion, the Claims Tribunal
132

Id. at 5.
Id.
134 Id. at 6.
135 Id. at 6–7. As part of the agreement, $1 billion in unfrozen Iranian assets was “retained in a special
‘Security Account’ as a fund for payment of awards by the Tribunal to American claimants.” Id. at 8. In
addition, the Algiers Accords “provided for the release of the hostages in return for a series of actions and
undertakings by the United States,” including the release of “approximately $8.1 billion held by the New York
Federal Reserve Bank and by overseas branches of United States banks.” Id. at 7. The United States “also
waived any right to proceed further, whether before the International Court of Justice or elsewhere, in respect
of the hostages.” Id. at 8.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 32 (“Iran consider[ed] persons who are nationals of Iran and claiming to possess American
nationality to be barred from bringing claims against Iran before the Tribunal; the United States [took] the
contrary view.”).
138 Iran–United States, Case No. A/18, 5 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251, 265 (1984); BROWER &
BRUESCHKE, supra note 129, at 32. The Full Tribunal “adopted this rule rather than the traditional doctrine of
‘nonresponsibility of states’ asserted by Iran.” Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era, supra note 22, at
599.
133
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explicitly rejected the doctrine of nonresponsibility.139 The Claims Tribunal
echoed both Nottebohm and Mergé, stating that “[i]n determining the dominant
and effective nationality, [it would] consider all relevant factors, including
habitual residence, center of interests, family ties, participation in public life
and other evidence of attachment.”140
2. The “Relevant Period”
The Claims Tribunal’s A/18 Decision noted that there is a “relevant period”
to consider in making the determination of an individual’s dominant and
effective nationality.141 A literal reading of the A/18 Decision suggests that the
relevant period is only “the time between the date the claim arose and the
signing of the Claims Settlement Declaration”;142 but in practice, the Claims
Tribunal’s chambers typically adopted a wider notion of A/18 Decision’s
“relevant period.”143 In Malek v. Iran, for instance, the claimant, who was born
with Iranian citizenship, left Iran at age seventeen in 1958, lived and worked in
the United States from 1966 onward, and became a U.S. permanent resident in
1972 before finally becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen in November 1980.144
Because his injuries stemmed from the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the claim
arose prior to his naturalization as a U.S. citizen.145 Yet in Malek, the Claims
Tribunal interpreted the A/18 Decision as giving a license to look at “the entire
life of the [c]laimant, from birth, and all the factors which, during this span of
time, evidence the reality and sincerity of the choice of national allegiance”
made by the claimant and found that the claimant’s dominant and effective
nationality was that of the United States during the relevant period.146 The

139 Case No. A/18, 5 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 262–63. The Full Tribunal rejected the 1930 Hague
Convention’s adoption of the nonresponsibility doctrine because it was “more than 50 years old and found in a
treaty to which only 20 States [were] parties.” Id. at 260. In adopting the dominant and effective nationality
approach, the Full Tribunal recognized that “great changes have occurred since then in the concept of
diplomatic protection.” Id. at 260–61. For discussion of the nonresponsibility doctrine, see supra Part II.A.
140 Case No. A/18, at 5 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 265 (1984); see also Bederman, supra note 127, at 125;
supra Part II.A. For a longer list of specific factors considered by the individual chambers of the tribunal in
subsequent cases, see BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 129, at 34–35.
141 Bederman, supra note 127, at 125.
142 Id. at 125–26.
143 Id. at 127–28.
144 Malek v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 19 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 48, 49–50 (1988).
145 Id. at 52.
146 Id. at 51, 55. The tribunal gave “little weight to a claimant’s activities after January 1981.” Bederman,
supra note 127, at 128 (emphasis added).
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Claims Tribunal followed the same approach in other cases for claimants
similarly situated.147
A commonly recurring factual setting faced by the Claims Tribunal would
involve “the claim of an American-born woman who had acquired Iranian
nationality involuntarily through the operation of Iranian marriage law.”148 In
one such case, Perry-Rohani v. Iran, the claimant would probably have been
considered a dominant and effective American under a literal reading of the
A/18 Decision’s timing requirement, “by virtue of her return to the United
States in 1978, well before her claim arose.”149 But there, the Claims Tribunal
“nonetheless held that Ms. Perry’s entire personal history suggested that she
had decided to [center] her life in Iran and that she had lost her cultural ties to
the United States.”150
Despite the body of cases in which the Claims Tribunal examined a
claimant’s entire life in determining her dominant and effective nationality,
there was, at some times, controversy.151 The American arbitrator in PerryRohani criticized the tribunal for focusing on “a temporary interlude in [the
claimant’s] life that ended, clearly and decisively, in August 1978, well before
the relevant period.”152 And of course critics of examining a claimant’s entire
life might point to a more literal reading of the A/18 Decision’s “relevant
period” discussion.153 But the majority of the Claims Tribunal’s cases after the
A/18 Decision seem to firmly establish that a claimant’s entire lifetime should
be considered the “relevant period” on which dominant nationality is earned.
3. Procedural Timing
In the aftermath of the Claims Tribunal’s A/18 Decision, the individual
chambers of the tribunal generally addressed the question of a dual national
claimant’s dominant and effective nationality as “a separate preliminary issue,”
before hearing the merits of the claim.154 In these proceedings, the burden of

147

Id.
Id.
149 Bederman, supra note 127, at 128; Perry-Rohani v. Iran, 22 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 194 (1989).
150 Bederman, supra note 127, at 128, 128 n.58.
151 Id. at 128.
152 Perry-Rohani, 22 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 202 (Allison, Arb., dissenting); Bederman, supra note
127, at 128.
153 See Bederman, supra note 127, at 125–26.
154 BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 129, at 33. Such procedural practices were put in place “in the
interests of efficiency and conservation of Tribunal and party resources.” Id.
148
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proof was “heavily placed on claimants to prove an eligible nationality.”155
After initially deferring consideration of all dual national cases following the
A/18 Decision, the Claims Tribunal decided in 1988 “to bifurcate the
procedure by first deciding whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction in each claim
[by determining the dominant and effective nationality of each claimant], and
only then turning to the merits.”156
4. Significance: The Dominant and Effective Test Has Application to Other
Contexts
The Claims Tribunal’s adoption of the dominant and effective nationality
approach “clearly reflected the growing trend to adopt the modern view of
non-responsibility.”157 However, the Claims Tribunal’s treatment of dual
nationals should not be limited to application in arbitration claims. The A/18
Decision was grounded in preexisting customary international law of
nationality and claims. The A/18 Decision may be seen as a codification of
preexisting international custom, noting that “the relevant rule of international
law . . . flows from the dictum of Nottebohm, the rule of real and effective
nationality, and the search for ‘stronger factual ties between the person
concerned and one of the States whose nationality is involved.’”158 In their
leading treatise on the Claims Tribunal, Charles Brower and Jason Brueschke
suggest that the significant number of cases in which the Claims Tribunal
applied the dominant and effective nationality test “certainly represent a large
source of precedent on the subject, which should serve as useful examples in
other contexts.”159
III. USE OF THE DOCTRINE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FIGHT ON
TERRORISM
One of the “other contexts” in which use of the doctrine of dominant and
effective nationality should prove valuable is with the West’s fight against
terrorism. The U.S. government, in particular, has been challenged at times
155

Bederman, supra note 127, at 135.
Id. at 126.
157 BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 129, at 320–21 (“It is significant that the Claims Tribunal, as the
international tribunal most recently to address the issue of dual nationals in arbitration claims, adopted the
dominant and effective nationality apporach.”). For further reading on the Claims Tribunal’s approach, as well
as a summary of preexisting customary international law on which the Claims Tribunal relied, see MAPP, supra
note 127, at 73–81.
158 Iran–United States, Case No. A/18, 5 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251, 265 (1984).
159 BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 129, at 321 (emphasis added).
156
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over the past decade to find legal support for its targeting of, detention of, and
adjudication practices with respect to terror suspects, particularly those who
hold U.S. citizenship.160 Faced with a growing number of homegrown terrorist
suspects, many of whom hold dual nationality, the U.S. government should use
the doctrine of dominant and effective nationality to its benefit in
distinguishing dual nationals who hold dominant foreign citizenship from those
who, in fact, hold dominant U.S. citizenship.
Part III.A establishes that customary international law is, in fact,
incorporated into domestic U.S. law. Part III.B demonstrates the need and
opportunity for the United States to invoke the doctrine of dominant and
effective nationality in dealing with a growing homegrown terrorist threat. Part
III.C briefly reflects on the doctrine’s utility for other Western nations, who are
engaged in combating homegrown terrorist threats of their own. Finally, Part
III.D examines two substantial dilemmas that domestic courts are likely to
face, and suggests an appropriate resolution to each.
A. Incorporation of Customary International Law in U.S. Domestic Law
More than a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed that
“[i]nternational law is part of our law.”161 In The Paquete Habana, the Court
was asked to determine whether two Cuban fishing boats, captured by U.S.
naval forces in the Spanish–American War and condemned as “prizes” of war,
were immune from capture under customary international law.162 The Court
accepted the premise that “where there is no treaty and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
160 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536–37 (2004) (“[I]t would turn our system of checks and
balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual
basis for his detention by his Government, simply because the Executive opposes making available such a
challenge. Absent suspension of the writ by Congress, a citizen detained as an enemy combatant is entitled to
this process.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and the War on
Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (“The Bush administration has claimed the authority to detain
American citizens indefinitely as enemy combatants without warrants, grand jury indictments, or trial by jury
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [T]hese actions are an assault on the Constitution.”); Mary Ellen
O’Connell, Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 863–64 (2009) (arguing that it is
unlawful to use targeting killings against terrorism suspects who are not fighting in a zone of hostilities and
instead arguing that governments must arrest suspects according to international human rights law); ACLU
Statement on Killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/
national-security/aclu-statement-killing-anwar-al-aulaqi (“As we’ve seen today, [the U.S. targeted killing
program] is a program under which American citizens far from any battlefield can be executed by their own
government without judicial process.”).
161 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
162 Id. at 678.

KANNOF GALLEYSFINAL2.DOC

2011]

3/21/2012 8:16 AM

DUELING NATIONALITIES

1395

customs and usages of civilized nations.”163 Finding significant evidence of
international custom as support, the Court ruled against the U.S. government in
holding that the capture was unlawful.164 While The Paquete Habana is the
Court’s most well-regarded proclamation of customary international law’s
place in domestic courts, several decisions have suggested the same.165
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed, as recently as 2004, the proposition that
customary international law is incorporated into U.S. domestic law.166 In Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court held firmly that “[i]t would take some
explaining to say now that federal courts must avert their gaze entirely from
any international norm intended to protect individuals.”167 There, the Court
noted that although it “would welcome any congressional guidance in
exercising jurisdiction with such obvious potential to affect foreign relations,
nothing Congress has done is a reason for us to shut the door to the law of
nations entirely.”168
In The Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court noted that it was “the general
policy of the government to conduct the war in accordance with the principles
of international law,”169 seemingly giving it the muster necessary to effectively
trump an executive decision with customary international law. Similarly, the
Obama Administration has repeatedly stated its intent to comply with

163

Id. at 700.
Id. at 714.
165 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (“[I]t is, of course, true that
United States courts apply international law as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances.”); The Nereide,
13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[T]he Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the
law of the land.”).
166 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (“For two centuries we have affirmed that the
domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”).
167 Id. at 730.
168 Id. at 731. However, “[i]t is enough to say that Congress may do that at any time (explicitly, or
implicitly by treaties or statutes that occupy the field), just as it may modify or cancel any judicial decision so
far as it rests on recognizing an international norm as such.” Id. The Authorization of Use of Military Force
Act of 2001, passed in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, did broaden the president’s powers and
ability to fight al Qaeda; but despite the recent ruling of a three-judge panel of a federal circuit court in AlBihani, the Act probably does not represent an attempt by Congress to exclude international law from binding
on the Act, as may have been contemplated by the Court in Sosa. See infra Part III.A.1.
169 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712 (1900). As evidence of this “general policy,” the Court cited a
proclamation issued by the President at the outset of the war, declaring that the United States would institute
and maintain its blockade of Cuba “in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and the law of nations.” Id.
Another Presidential proclamation contained the recital: “It being desirable that such war should be conducted
upon principles in harmony with the present views of nations and sanctioned by their recent practice.” Id.
164
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principles of international law.170 President Barack Obama himself, in his
Nobel Lecture, said, “I have reaffirmed America’s commitment to abide by the
Geneva Conventions. We lose ourselves when we compromise the very ideals
that we fight to defend.”171 As was the case with the McKinley Administration
during the Spanish–American War, this presidential administration has made
clear its general policy to conduct wars in accordance with the principles of
international law.
1. Al-Bihani and the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force as a
Possible Challenge to the Incorporation of International Law into
Domestic Law
Despite established precedent that international law is incorporated into
U.S. law, there have been recent challenges. On January 5, 2010, a three-judge
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
released a decision in which it claims that the war powers granted to the
President by the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”),172 which
empowered the President to respond to the attacks of September 11, 2001, are
not limited even by international laws of war.173 In that case, Al-Bihani, a
Yemeni citizen who had been captured in 2002 and detained since that time,
challenged his detention with a petition for habeas corpus.174 The three-judge
panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a federal district court’s
denial of Al-Bihani’s release.175 The court stated that “[t]here is no indication
in the AUMF, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 . . . , or [Military
Commissions Act] of 2006 or 2009, that Congress intended the international
laws of war to act as extra-textual limiting principles for the President’s war

170 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, The Obama Administration and
International Law, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25,
2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. In his speech to the American Society of
International Law, Koh remarked that the “[Obama] Administration has pursued principled engagement with
the [International Criminal Court] and the Human Rights Council, and has reaffirmed its commitment to
international law with respect to all three aspects of the armed conflicts in which we find ourselves: detention,
targeting and prosecution.” Id.
171 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize (Dec.
10, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize.
172 Authorization for Use of Military Force Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001) (reprinted at 50 U.S.C. § 1541).
173 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011); see
also John Schwartz, Court Backs War Powers over Rights of Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2010, at A12.
174 Schwartz, supra note 173.
175 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 881.
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powers under the AUMF.”176 The Supreme Court denied certiorari for the case
on April 4, 2011.177
Ultimately, it appears that the panel’s broad holding was erroneous.
Although the AUMF and later legislation did not expressly state that the
President should be bound by international treaties that have been ratified by
the Senate, such as the Geneva Convention, they did not need to; Article VI of
the Constitution clearly states that all treaties “shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.”178 One commentator stated that the court had “gone out of its way to
poke a stick in the eye of the Supreme Court.”179 Some commentators who are
typically unenthusiastic for the incorporation of international law into domestic
jurisprudence have stated that the court went too far in its Al-Bihani
decision.180
Perhaps most telling, Judge Williams, one of the three members of the AlBihani panel, pointed out that the majority’s conclusion that the AUMF and
other statutes are not limited by the international laws of war is entirely
inconsistent with the approach that the Supreme Court took in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.181 In his concurring opinion, Williams suggests that the court’s
broad pronouncements against incorporation of international law were
unnecessary, noting that “[c]uriously, the majority’s dictum goes well beyond
what even the government has argued in this case.”182
2. Though Not Overturned by the Supreme Court, Al-Bihani Still Does Not
Preclude the U.S. Government’s Use of the Dominant and Effective
Doctrine
Even though the Supreme Court declined to review the panel decision in
Al-Bihani, the U.S. government should still be free to use the doctrine of
dominant and effective nationality in combating suspected terrorists. Two out
176 Id. at 871 (citation omitted); see also Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat.
2190 (2009); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005).
177 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011), denying cert. to Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 866.
178 Ilya Somin, The Al Bihani Case and the Domestic Application of International Law, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 5, 2010, 11:52 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/01/05/the-al-bihani-case-and-the-domesticapplication-of-international-law; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI.
179 Schwartz, supra note 173. The court’s decision represents an effort to expand government power even
beyond the limits laid out in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2007). Schwartz, supra note 173.
180 See, e.g., Somin, supra note 178.
181 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 883 (Williams, J., concurring).
182 Id. at 885.
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of the three judges on the panel held that the president’s powers under the
AUMF are not limited by “international laws of war.”183 The doctrine of
dominant and effective nationality is not part of the “international laws of
war”; rather, it stems from customary international law.184 Therefore, the
panel’s statement was probably too narrow to reach the doctrine.
Moreover, the panel made no suggestion that Congress’ enacting of the
AUMF precludes the U.S. government from following international law
standards if it should so choose. The use of the doctrine of dominant and
effective nationality in dealing with suspects of terrorism-related offenses only
works in the government’s favor. Even if Al-Bihani’s proposition against
incorporation of international law into domestic law were someday reviewed
upheld, it would nonetheless behoove the U.S. government to push for
application of the doctrine in situations where a defendant or a targeted
individual held dual citizenship with the United States and another country.
Such action would be perfectly legal under international law,185 and may prove
an invaluable tool in the government’s “War on Terror” going forward.
B. The United States’ Potential Use of the Doctrine of Dominant and Effective
Nationality in Fighting an Increasing Homegrown Terrorist Threat
In recent years, the United States has seen a surge in homegrown terrorist
threats and attempted attacks.186 U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder noted in
December 2010 “that 50 of the 126 people indicted in the United States on
terror-related charges over the past two years were American citizens.”187
Holder continued to state the increased threat of homegrown terrorists facing
the United States:
The threat has changed from simply worrying about foreigners
coming here to worrying about people in the United States, American
citizens—raised here, born here, and who, for whatever reason, have
decided that they are going to become radicalized and take up arms
188
against the nation in which they were born.

183

Id. at 873 (majority opinion).
Id. at 871.
185 Provided, of course, that the underlying detention or targeting of the individual were itself allowable
under international and U.S. law.
186 Toni Johnson, Threat of Homegrown Islamist Terrorism, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.
org/publication/11509/threat_of_homegrown_islamist_terrorism.html (last updated Sept. 30, 2011).
187 Earle & Soltis, supra note 4.
188 Id.
184
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A survey of indictments only scratches the surface of the United States’
growing problem. In 2010 alone, the U.S. government charged, convicted, or
sentenced more than sixty Americans, most of them labeled as “Muslim
extremists,” on terrorism-related offenses—many of which involved plots of
violent attacks within the United States.189 A noticeably high number of those
charged were naturalized U.S. citizens,190 and the figures for 2009 are
staggeringly similar.191 Naturalized U.S. citizens charged in the past few years
with terrorism-related offenses hail from Afghanistan,192 Australia,193
Bosnia,194 Dominican Republic,195 Egypt,196 Guyana,197 Iran,198 Jordan,199

189

Criminal Proceedings: A Timeline of U.S. Terror Cases, Criminal Proceedings in 2010, ANTILEAGUE (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/american_muslim_extremists_
criminal_proceedings.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_2.
190 Id.
191 Criminal Proceedings: A Timeline of U.S. Terror Cases, Criminal Proceedings in 2009, ANTIDEFAMATION LEAGUE (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/american_muslim_extremists_
criminal_proceedings.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_3.
192 See, e.g., Jerry Markon, Terror Defendant Says al-Qaeda Leaders Ordered Subway Attack, WASH.
POST, Apr. 24, 2010, at A4 (describing the case of Zarein Ahmedzay, a New York City cab driver, who pled
guilty to charges that he plotted suicide attacks in “what authorities call one of the most serious terrorism plots
on American soil since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks”); Virginia Man Charged with Threatening To Carry Out
Attacks in D.C., ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/dc_attacks_
threat.htm (describing the case of Awais Younis, a naturalized U.S. citizen who was arrested and charged with
threatening to bomb high-traffic areas in Washington, D.C.).
193 Benjamin Weiser, 2 Ex-Brooklyn Men Charged in Terror Plot, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2010, at A16
(describing the case of Sabirhan Hasanoff, who was charged and indicted for conspiring “to modernize Al
Qaeda by providing computer systems expertise”).
194 John Marzulli et al., Queens Man Adis Medunjanin, Linked to Zazi NYC Terror Bomb Plot, Pleads Not
Guilty, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 9, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/queens_man_adis_
medunjanin_linked_zazi_nyc_terror_bomb_plot_pleads_guilty_article__1.193704 (describing the case of Adis
Medunjanin, who was charged with spending “two months at a terrorist training camp in Pakistan and planning
an attack against New York targets”).
195 Perry Chiaramonte et al., Bloodlust of NJ ‘Jihadists,’ N.Y. POST (June 7, 2010, 3:28 AM), http://www.
nypost.com/p/news/local/bloodlust_of_tjUWgKCSnGMpRDcz9eUBXJ (describing the case of Carlos
Eduardo Almonte, a Muslim convert, who was arrested in June 2010 while trying to leave the country,
“allegedly en route to Somalia for training to kill Americans overseas—and back at home”). The criminal
complaint alleged that Almonte boasted, “I’m gonna get a gun. . . . It’s already enough that you don’t worship
Allah, so . . . that’s a reason for you to die.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
196 Massachusetts Man Arrested for Attempting To Wage “Violent Jihad” Against America, ANTIDEFAMATION LEAGUE (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/tarek_mehanna_arrest.htm
(describing the case of Tarek Mehanna, who was charged with “conspiring to provide material support to Al
Qaeda”).
197 John Marzulli & Bill Hutchinson, Guilty: Would-Be Terrorists Russell Defreitas, Abdul Kadir Face
Life in Prison for JFK Bomb Plot, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 2, 2010), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-0802/news/27071504_1_russell-defreitas-jfk-bomb-plot-jet-fuel (describing a case in which two men were
convicted “of plotting to turn Kennedy Airport into a gargantuan fireball that would rival the 9/11 attacks”).
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Lebanon,200 Morocco,201 Nicaragua,202 Pakistan,203 Somalia,204 as well as
Palestine.205
In the aftermath of Faisal Shahzad’s failed car-bombing in Times Square,
Senator Joseph Lieberman, head of the Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, told Fox News that he planned to introduce a bill that
would amend current law “that bars American citizens from fighting for

198 Associated Press, 52-Year-Old Iranian Widow Faces Terror Charges in New York City, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (June 19, 2008, 6:58 AM) http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/52-year-old-iranian-widow-facesterror-charges-york-city-article-1.293912.
199 Brian Bennett, How the U.S. Nabbed Alleged Terrorists in Toledo, TIME (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.
time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1161879,00.html.
200 See, e.g., Bolivia’s Triborder Zone a Haven for Terror Funding, WASH. TIMES (July 13, 2010), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/13/bolivias-triborder-zone-a-haven-for-terror-funding (detailing the
arrest of Moussa Ali Hamdan, a Lebanese–American accused of financing Hezbollah).
201 Terry Frieden, U.S. Citizen Pleads Guilty to Sending Funds to al Qaeda, CNN (May 19, 2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-05-19/justice/missouri.al.qaeda.funding.plea_1_qaeda-united-arab-emirates-guilty
(recounting Khalid Ouazzani’s admission of “providing more than $23,000 to al Qaeda, to which he had
pledged an oath of allegiance in 2008”).
202 Baltimore Man Arrested for Attempting To Bomb Army Recruiting Center, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
(Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/Antonio_Martinez.htm; Maria Glod, Bomb Plot Case May
Be Harbinger: Defense Sees ‘Sting,’ WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2010, at B1; Mara Gay, Who Is Accused Baltimore
Terrorist Antonio Martinez?, AOL NEWS (Dec. 9, 2010, 2:32 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/
12/09/who-is-accused-baltimore-terrorist-antonio-martinez (discussing Antonio Martinez, a Muslim convert
who was arrested and charged in December 2010 with attempting to blow up a military recruiting station in
Maryland).
203 See, e.g., Aaron Katersky & Richard Esposito, Faisal Shahzad: ‘War With Muslims Has Just Begun,’
ABC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/times-square-bomber-faisal-shahzad-sentencedlife/story?id=11802740 (describing the sentencing of Faisal Shahzad, the Pakistani–American convicted of
attempting to detonate a car bomb in New York’s Times Square); Kerry Willis et al., Farooque Ahmed, Man
Busted in Alleged Metro Bomb Plot, Wanted To Fight US Overseas, FBI Says, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 28,
2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2010/10/28/2010-10-28_farooque_ahmed_man_busted_
in_alleged_metro_bomb_plot_wanted_to_fight_us_overseas.html.
204 See, e.g., Jana Winter, Portland Terror Suspect a Self-proclaimed Moral Authority Online, FOX NEWS
(Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/12/03/oregon-alleged-tree-bomber-online-moral-authority
(describing the case of Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a Somali-born American teenager who was “accused of
plotting to blow up a tree-lighting ceremony” in Oregon in December 2010); The Road to Terror Training
Camps Sometimes Begins in the U.S., CNN (Aug. 12, 2010, 2:43 PM), http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2010/08/12/
the-road-to-terror-training-camps-sometimes-begins-in-the-u-s (“14 U.S.-born and naturalized citizens [were
indicted in August 2010] . . . on charges of conspiring with a Somali terrorist organization affiliated with al
Qaeda.”).
205 Arizona Man Charged with Lying About Alleged Hamas Fundraising, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
(Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/akram_musa_abdallah_charged.htm (describing the
sentencing of Akram Musa Abdallah to eighteen months in prison for making false representations to FBI
agents about his involvement in fund-raising activities for a Muslim charity accused of “funneling over $12
million to individuals and organizations linked to Hamas”).
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foreign armies at the price of losing their citizenship”206 to extend to
Americans who are accused of joining foreign terrorist organizations.207 If it
were ever to become law, such legislation would allow the United States to
strip American citizens accused of affiliating with foreign terrorist groups of
their citizenship and try them in a military tribunal, in which the accused
would retain fewer protections than does a U.S. citizen being tried in domestic
courts.208 As a practical and constitutional matter, however, such a bill is
unlikely to be passed within the United States.209
Insofar as the United States generally lacks the ability to unilaterally strip a
dual national of her American citizenship, even if the U.S. government initially
granted her U.S. citizenship through naturalization,210 determination of her
206 Jordan Fabian, Lieberman Wants To Strip Citizenship of Americans Who Join Foreign Terror Orgs.,
HILL (May 4, 2010, 3:46 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/95967-lieberman-wants-tostrip-citizenship-of-americans-who-join-foreign-terror-orgs; Lieberman Unveils Bill To Strip U.S. Citizenship
of Terror Suspects Arrested Abroad, FOX NEWS (May 6, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/05/06/
lieberman-unveils-strip-citizenship-terror-suspects-abroad.
207 Fabian, supra note 206. Senator Lieberman stated on Fox News on May 4, 2010, “I think it’s time for
us to look at whether we want to amend that law to apply it to American citizens who choose to become
affiliated with foreign terrorist organizations, whether they should not also be deprived automatically of their
citizenship and therefore be deprived of rights that come with that citizenship when they are apprehended and
charged with a terrorist act.” Id.; see also Tony Karon et al., Times Square Bomb Arrest Raises U.S. Security
Questions, TIME (May 5, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1987126,00.html. However,
Lieberman suggested that “it would be going too far to re-examine naturalized U.S. citizens from select
countries like Pakistan in light of the Times Square bombing attempt.” Bomb Suspect’s Citizenship Raises
Questions About Naturalization Process, FOX NEWS (May 4, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/
05/04/times-square-suspects-citizenship-raises-questions-naturalization-process
(quoting
Lieberman’s
statement, “I wouldn’t want to single out a group”).
208 Fabian, supra note 206. This proposed legislation is different from the use of the doctrine of dominant
and effective nationality as advocated in this Comment. First, although a dominant foreign citizen may be
treated like a noncitizen for purposes of the court proceeding at hand, application of the doctrine does not
“strip” an individual of their dual citizenship. Second, Senator Lieberman’s proposal, if adopted, would allow
the government to strip a U.S. citizen of their citizenship regardless of whether they are a dual national; and if
the accused were a dual national, their U.S. citizenship would be revoked irrespective of whether a court
would have found them to have been a dominant U.S. citizen.
209 See, e.g., Steve Benen, Lieberman’s Tenuous Understanding of Due Process, WASH. MONTHLY (May
5, 2010), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2010_05/023652.php.
210 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). There, the Court was faced with a statute that allowed the
United States to revoke the nationality of “a person who has become a national by naturalization” if that
person had “a continuous residence for three years in the territory of a foreign state of which he was formerly a
national.” Id. at 164. The Court rejected the statute, holding:

A native-born citizen is free to reside abroad indefinitely without suffering loss of citizenship.
The discrimination aimed at naturalized citizens [in the statute] drastically limits their rights to
live and work abroad in a way that other citizens may. It creates indeed a second-class
citizenship. Living abroad, whether the citizen be naturalized or native born, is no badge of lack
of allegiance and in no way evidences a voluntary renunciation of nationality and allegiance.
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dominant and effective nationality remains ever important. The U.S.
Department of State instructs, “[A] person naturalized as a U.S. citizen may
not lose the citizenship of the country of birth. U.S. law does not . . . require a
person to choose one citizenship or another.”211
In Shahzad’s case, for example, the press made much ado about Shahzad’s
holding of U.S. citizenship while attempting an attack on U.S. soil.212 Yet upon
his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 2009,213 Shahzad needed only to “swear
allegiance” to the United States—neither the United States214 nor Pakistan215
required him to renounce his Pakistani citizenship when acquiring U.S.
citizenship. At the time of his capture and trial, therefore, Shahzad held dual
citizenship and the doctrine of dominant and effective nationality could have
Id. at 168–69. In another case, the Court held that a dual U.S.–Mexican national—who had been living in the
United States from birth in 1922, moved to Mexico in 1942 “for the purpose of evading [compulsory] military
service in [the U.S.] armed forces,” and returned to the United States only upon the conclusion of World War
II—could not be stripped of his U.S. citizenship simply for having intentionally evaded the wartime draft.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 146 (1963) (explaining that upon return to the United States, a
draft dodger’s subjection to criminal prosecution is penalty enough; intentional evasion of military service is
not so egregious as to merit expatriation).
211 US State Department Services Dual Nationality, supra note 25; see also Dual Citizenship,
NEWCITIZEN.US, http://www.newcitizen.us/dual.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). However, “a person who
acquires a foreign citizenship by applying for it may lose U.S. citizenship [if the person applies] for the foreign
citizenship voluntarily, by free choice, and with the intention to give up U.S. citizenship. Intent can be shown
by the person’s statements or conduct.” US State Department Services Dual Nationality, supra note 25. Yet,
absent explicit renunciation of her U.S. citizenship, the intent of a person who is naturalized in a foreign
country to retain U.S. citizenship is presumed. Advice About Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship and Dual
Nationality, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV (Feb. 1, 2008), http://travel.state.gov/law/citizenship/citizenship_778.html.
212 See, e.g., Josh Barbanel et al., From New Citizen to Suspect in a Year, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703866704575224451665380256.html; Alison Gendar et al.,
Faisal Shahzad, Times Sq. Bomb Suspect, Nabbed Within “Minutes” of Escape; 2 Held in Pakistan, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (May 4, 2010), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-05-04/local/27063454_1_bomb-plot-bombmaterials-international-flight.
213 Barbanel et al., supra note 212.
214 Transcript of Faisal Shahzad’s Sentencing Hearing at 5, United States v. Shahzad, 10 Cr. 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), available at http://www.N.Y.post.com/p/news/local/manhattan/read_the_faisal_shahzad_
transcript_zDoUXlGEMoqZMwzsIRrlkM. One portion of the transcript reads:
THE COURT: . . . Didn’t you swear allegiance to this country when you became an American
citizen?
THE DEFENDANT: I did swear, but I did not mean it.
THE COURT: I see. You took a false oath?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
Id.; see also US State Department Services Dual Nationality, supra note 25 (“U.S. law does not . . . require a
person [being naturalized as a U.S. citizen] to choose one citizenship or another.”).
215 Immigration Policy, DIRECTORATE GEN. IMMIGR. & PASSPORTS, MINISTRY INTERIOR, GOV’T PAK.,
http://www.dgip.gov.pk/files/Immigration.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (noting that the “[g]overnment of
Pakistan has dual nationality arrangements with . . . 16 countries,” including the United States).
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been applied. Although the United States arrested, tried, and sentenced
Shahzad affording him the full protections of U.S. citizenship, it may not have
been required to under customary international law (if the court were to hold,
as a threshold determination, that Shahzad was a dominant and effective
Pakistani national).
C. The Need and Potential Use of the Doctrine by Foreign Nations
The fight against homegrown terrorist threats is not confined to the United
States. European nations, too, face an increased threat posed by their own
nationals.216 In March 2011, for example, a dual German–Yugoslavian
citizen217 opened fire on a U.S. military bus at Germany’s Frankfurt Airport,
killing two U.S. airmen, after having been recently radicalized from spending
time on local, radical Islamist websites.218 In December 2010, Dutch
authorities arrested twelve men of Somali origin whom officials believed were
about to carry out a terrorist attack within the Netherlands; some of the twelve
suspects held Dutch citizenship.219 Earlier that month, a suicide bomber
attacked shoppers in central Stockholm, Sweden;220 the bomber was an Iraqiborn Swedish national.221 In October 2010, French police arrested twelve
people in southern France for suspected trafficking of arms and explosives,
allegedly in connection with al Qaeda,222 and up to eight German Islamic
216 For a report on Europe’s homegrown terrorism phenomenon, including a lengthy discussion on the
motivations driving such extremists, see TOMAS PRECHT, DEN. MINISTRY OF JUST., HOME GROWN TERRORISM
AND ISLAMIST RADICALISATION IN EUROPE: FROM CONVERSION TO TERRORISM (2007), available at
www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning_og_dokumentation/Home_grown_terrorism_and_Is
lamist_radicalisation_in_Europe_-_an_assessment_of_influencing_factors__2_.pdf.
217 The twenty-one-year-old man was originally from Kosovo, but held a passport from Yugoslavia that
was issued before Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008. Two U.S. Airmen Killed in
German Airport Shooting, CNN (Mar. 3, 2011, 8:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/03/02/
germany.shooting/index.html.
218 German Official: Airport Gunman a Muslim Who Wanted To Kill American Troops, CNN (Mar. 3,
2011, 7:33 AM), http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/03/german-official-airport-gunman-a-muslim-whowanted-to-kill-american-troops; Two U.S. Airmen Killed in German Airport Shooting, supra note 217.
219 Per Nyberg, Dutch Arrest 12 on Suspicion of Terrorism, CNN (Dec. 25, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/
2010/WORLD/europe/12/25/netherlands.arrests/index.html.
220 Ben Quinn, Stockholm Explosions Leave One Dead and Two Injured, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2010,
12:26 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/12/stockholm-sweden-bombs-explosions.
221 Stockholm Suspect Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly Profiled, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2010, 9:20 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11981228; see also Andrew Ward, Sweden Reveals Home-Grown Terror
Threat, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2010, 6:26 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/35bfc826-0873-11e0-80d900144feabdc0.html#axzz1AkUhYXV7.
222 Ariel Zirulnick, France Arrests 12 as Concerns Grow About “Homegrown” Terrorism, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2010/1005/France-arrests12-as-concerns-grow-about-homegrown-terrorism. Zirulnick writes, “Western governments are concerned that
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militants were killed in a U.S. strike in Pakistan.223 The most significant
homegrown terror attack in Europe to date, which occurred on July 7, 2005,
claimed the lives of fifty-six people (including the four bombers) and injured
more than 700 others in a coordinated attack on London’s subways;224 the
bombers were British-born citizens of Pakistani descent.225
Europe, like the United States, has even been touched by the breadth of alAulaqi’s influence. In March 2011, following the conviction of a former
British Airways computer specialist for terrorism-related offenses, British
politicians pressed internet giants Google and YouTube to remove all of alAulaqi’s video content from their websites.226 Al-Aulaqi inspired the former
British Airways employee to explore ways of staging attacks.227 In the
aftermath of the March 2011 shooting of U.S. military at Frankfurt Airport,
bloggers immediately began questioning whether al-Aulaqi inspired or had a
direct hand in aiding the shooter, pointing out the similarities between this and
other attacks from the past few years for which al-Aulaqi has been
implicated.228

Al Qaeda is turning to sympathizers who hold citizenship in Western countries to assist Al Qaeda operatives in
carrying out terrorist attacks in Western Europe.” Id.
223 David Crossland, ‘Germany Must Do More to Combat Homegrown Terrorism,’ SPIEGEL (Oct. 6,
2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,721584,00.html.
224 London on Edge, CBC NEWS, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/london_bombing (last updated July
7, 2006). British officials say that Britain continues to face a growing homegrown terrorist threat. Carole
Erskine, Warning over Threat of Home-Grown Terrorism, SKY NEWS (Aug. 27, 2010, 10:33 AM),
http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Politics/Terror-Britain-Faces-Increasing-Threat-From-Home-GrownTerrorists-Warn-Rusi-Experts/Article/201008415707485.
225 Family Who 7/7 Bomber Khan Left Behind, YORKSHIRE POST (May 10, 2007), http://www.
yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/Family-who-77-bomber-Khan.2867933.jp; Mark Townsend, Leak Reveals Official
Story of London Bombings, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2006), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/apr/09/july7.
uksecurity.
226 UK Politicians Press Google/YouTube To Remove al-Awlaki Videos AGAIN, UN:DHIMMI (Mar. 1,
2011),
http://undhimmi.com/2011/03/01/uk-politicians-press-googleyoutube-to-remove-al-awlaki-videosagain. Interestingly, this article points out that “Google/YouTube are, it seems, able to ensure that virtually no
hard core pornography or significant portions of copyrighted Big Media/Hollywood content is show by their
site. Yet when it comes to violent Jihadists inciting murder . . . there’s simply insufficient incentive . . . to act
in anything other than the most half-hearted and token manner.” Id. Part of this lack of incentive stems from
the fact that Google and YouTube face an ever-present threat of legal action from Hollywood producers and
producers of pornography, while terrorists who use the internet are more than happy to allow these websites to
provide free hosting and to distribute their materials worldwide. Id.
227 Id.
228 See, e.g., Robert, Frankfurt Airport Attack “Fits in the Category of ‘Armed Jihadist Assault’ Similar to
What . . . al-Awlaki Called for,” JIHAD WATCH (Mar. 2, 2011, 9:26 AM), http://www.jihadwatch.org/
2011/03/frankfurt-airport-attack-fits-in-the-category-of-armed-jihadist-assault-similar-to-what-american-bor.
html.
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Of course, not every nation embraces the idea of dual citizenship,229 and
each state is free to allow or treat dual nationality as it pleases.230 But
inevitably, European law enforcement officials will arrest and charge
naturalized citizens with homegrown terrorism-related offenses. In hearing
such cases, a nation’s domestic courts should, to establish the relevant rights
and protections owed to the suspect, determine the dominant and effective
nationality of the accused before proceeding to the merits of the case.
D. Difficulties That May Arise in Applying the Doctrine of Dominant and
Effective Nationality to Other Dual Citizen Terrorists
While the body of precedent in customary international law provides some
guidance on issues involving dual citizenship, it leaves ever more questions
open. Determining al-Aulaqi’s dominant and effective nationality involves a
complex analysis;231 but in many ways, compared with situations that are
likely to arise in the near future, his illustrates the “easy” case.
For example, al-Aulaqi, for the most part, spent his entire life residing
either in Yemen or the United States, and his cultural and familial ties lay, in
great part, either in Yemen or the United States.232 But one can imagine the
case of a dual national whose habitual residence or cultural ties lay with a third
state, of which the individual is not a citizen. In applying the doctrine of
dominant and effective nationality, a tribunal must make the ultimate
determination of dominant nationality by choosing from only the countries of
which the individual is a citizen. Part III.D.1 examines how the tribunal should
treat an individual’s significant ties with a third state.
As another example, consider that al-Aulaqi was born holding dual
citizenship, and was not required to go through any naturalization process.
Even so, he spent enough time in the United States and in Yemen to become
culturally familiar with the practices and societies of both countries. But one
can imagine the case of a recently naturalized citizen who has every intention
to fully integrate into her new nation of citizenship, but has not yet had
229 See, e.g., James Butty, US, Liberians Launch Dual Citizenship Petition Drive, VOICE AM. NEWS (Jan.
5,
2011),
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Butty-Liberia-Dual-Citizenship-Petition-DriveKamara-05january11-112918084.html (discussing a petition to urge the current Liberian government to make
dual citizenship recognizable under Liberian law).
230 US State Department Services Dual Nationality, supra note 25 (“Each country has its own citizenship
laws based on its own policy.”).
231 See infra Part IV.
232 See infra Part IV.B.
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sufficient time to do so. Part III.D.2 considers how, under the doctrine,
naturalized citizens may be treated differently from individuals who received
dual nationality at birth.
1. A Dual National’s Ties to a State with Which She Does Not Hold
Citizenship
The vast majority of precedential cases involve a dispute in which the
individual resided in one of the countries of her citizenship.233 And in the alAulaqi matter, with the exception of a brief stint in England from 2002 to
2004, al-Aulaqi continuously resided either in the United States or in
Yemen.234 But what if, rather than fleeing to Yemen in 2004, al-Aulaqi had
remained in England after leaving the United States? Had al-Aulaqi remained
in England from 2002 until his death, how should the location of his residence
have played into the determination of his dominant and effective citizenship?
While not itself dispositive, the “habitual residence” factor appears generally to
be heavily weighted in the determination of an individual’s dominant and
effective nationality (particularly because the place in which an individual
lives has a direct effect on her ability to integrate into a particular nation’s
society, participate in public life, etc.). Yet customary international law
provides little guidance on exactly how to treat an individual whose habitual
residence is in neither of her two states of citizenship.
A fairly mechanical test is used to determine an individual’s country of
“habitual residence.”235 However, because a tribunal must determine a dual
citizen’s dominant citizenship by choosing between her states of citizenship, a
fundamental dilemma arises when an individual resides in a third state. After
all, the consideration of “habitual residence” leaves little room for a tribunal to
exercise subjectivity.236 If a dual national’s habitual residence lies in a country
of which she is not a citizen, a tribunal has two options: (1) it may ignore the
third-state residence entirely, or (2) it may try to reconcile the third-state
residence by inferring that its location or society has allowed the individual to
keep closer ties with one of her nations of citizenship.
It seems that a tribunal would be in error to entirely ignore an individual’s
third-state residency. Indeed, the U.S. Department of State’s website explains
233
234
235
236

Bederman, supra note 127, at 126.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.1.
See infra Part IV.C.1.
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that “[t]he country where a dual national is located generally has a stronger
claim to that person’s allegiance.”237 The doctrine of dominant and effective
nationality aims to determine an individual’s primary national allegiance; if an
individual’s third-state residence helps identify allegiance to a particular nation
or a particular region, then a tribunal should be able to consider it in
determining an individual’s dominant nationality.238
This second option, however, carries its own set of difficulties. For
argument’s sake, suppose that instead of returning to Yemen in 2004, al-Aulaqi
remained in England from 2002 until his death. If a tribunal were to view this
third state as somewhat of an extension of one of al-Aulaqi’s two states of
citizenship, then a court reasonably might find that England is socially,
culturally, politically, and economically more similar to the United States than
it is to Yemen. Should that determination, then, weigh in favor of a finding that
al-Aulaqi would be considered a dominant national of the United States?
Suppose, instead, that al-Aulaqi left the United States for Saudi Arabia in
2002, and remained there until his death. Should a tribunal find that because
Saudi Arabia is more culturally and politically tied to Yemen than the United
States, al-Aulaqi’s residence in Saudi Arabia favors a finding that he was a
dominant national of Yemen?
This hypothetical can become even more muddled. Imagine that al-Aulaqi
moved to China, which is easily relatable to neither the United States nor
Yemen, in 2002 and remained there until his death. Or imagine a case
involving a dual national of the United States and Canada, two nations that are
fairly geographically and culturally similar, whose habitual residence is in a
third state. The difficulties that face a tribunal tasked with determining how to
treat third-state residency quickly become obvious.
Although questions still abound, the Claims Tribunal did attempt to reach
this issue. One case before the Claims Tribunal, Benedix v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, involved a claimant who resided in neither the United States nor Iran
during the “relevant period.”239 Iranian by birth, Mrs. Benedix married a U.S.
national in 1954.240 The couple “lived in the United States for three years, then
237

US State Department Services Dual Nationality, supra note 25.
The problem inherent to this approach, however, is that the doctrine, it would seem, becomes
ineffective when an individual’s nation of “primary allegiance” (which, frequently, is also her nation of
habitual residence) lies with a nation of which she cannot, by definition, be considered a “dominant and
effective citizen.”
239 Benedix v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 21 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 20 (1989).
240 Id.
238
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lived in Iran for twenty years until 1978. Thereafter the couple lived in the
United Kingdom.”241 The Claims Tribunal noted:
At present [the claimant] apparently lives in London, England, where
she and her husband chose to reside upon leaving Iran in 1978.
Evidence provided by the Claimant . . . [is] insufficient to support a
finding that Mrs. Benedix’s links to the United States were dominant
during the relevant period between the time when her Claims
allegedly arose in 1979 and [the signing of the Claims Settlement
242
Declaration in 1981].

In Benedix, “the decisive fact must have been the couple’s choice not to
return to the United States.”243 Yet at the same time, it can be said that the
claimant, similarly, chose not to remain in Iran. Benedix is rendered even less
useful because the chamber of the Claims Tribunal that heard the case adopted
a literal interpretation of the A/18 Decision in determining the relevant period
of inquiry (and, in turn, found that the claimant had lived in England
throughout the relevant period).244 In practice, the chambers typically
considered a claimant’s entire lifetime as part of the relevant period.245 Thus,
Benedix is of limited use in guiding contemporary application of the doctrine
of the dominant and effective nationality.
Several other cases show that the Claims Tribunal held claimants having
contacts with third countries to a high standard of proof of attachment.246 For
cases heard by the Claims Tribunal, it was generally “insufficient for these
individuals to show that their dominant and effective nationality was not
Iranian, but, rather, that it was indisputably American.”247 On the other hand,
modern commentators suggest that this standard may ask too much.248
Perhaps a tribunal’s best approach, when faced with a dual citizen whose
habitual residence (or center of interests, family ties, or other evidence of
attachment) during the relevant period lies within neither of her two states of
241

MAPP, supra note 127, at 79.
Benedix, 21 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 23.
243 Bederman, supra note 127, at 130. Otherwise, Professor Bederman writes, “[T]his claim is
indistinguishable from a number of cases in which individuals left Iran in mid- to late 1978 after long stays,
returned to America, and were found to have acquired dominant and effective American nationality by the
close of the ‘relevant period’ in January 1981.” Id. at 130–31.
244 Benedix, 21 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
245 See, e.g., Malek v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 19 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 48 (1988).
246 Bederman, supra note 127, at 131.
247 Id.
248 Id.
242
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citizenship, is simply to give greater weight to each of the other considerations.
The tribunal should use the third-state residence in its consideration of the
other factors. If an individual is a dual U.S.–Yemeni national, for instance, but
lived in each nation only briefly and has spent the majority of her life as a
permanent resident of Canada, a tribunal should not be precluded from
considering the effect that such habitual residence has had on her center of
interests and cultural ties, as it deems appropriate, with each the United States
and Yemen. In diminishing the weight it grants to one factor, however, the
tribunal must afford greater weight to each of the other factors. Likewise, when
the dominancy of an individual’s center of interests or cultural ties are simply
unclear or indeterminable, even if they do not necessarily lie with a third state,
a tribunal should give greater weight to each of the other factors in determining
an individual’s dominant nationality.
2. Problems Presented by Recently Naturalized Dual Citizens
In Danielpour v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Claims Tribunal accepted
that a young woman held dual nationality by virtue of being born in the United
States of Iranian parents.249 In determining her dominant nationality, the
Claims Tribunal contemplated that the eighteen months she had lived in the
United States prior to her claim arising “would not have been adequate for the
Claimant to integrate into American society and to familiarize herself with
American culture so as to predominate over her years spent in Iran under the
influence of her Iranian family and the society and culture of Iran.”250 The
Claims Tribunal’s approach in Danielpour, if applied by U.S. courts in
contemporary contexts, appears rather problematic for newly naturalized U.S.
citizens.
In the United States, an applicant for naturalization typically must be a
permanent resident (green card holder) before filing.251 An applicant for

249

Danielpour v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 118 (1989).
Id.
251 Citizenship Through Naturalization, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/
site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextchannel=d84d6811264a3210VgnVCM100
000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextoid=d84d6811264a3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD (last updated June 3,
2011). In addition to the residency requirement, an applicant usually must take the naturalization test to
demonstrate that she is able to read, write, and speak basic English and that she has a basic knowledge of U.S.
history and government, must have her fingerprints taken, must submit to a naturalization interview, and must
take an oath of allegiance to the United States. Id.; see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., A
GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION 31 (2011), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/M-476.pdf; Bomb
Suspect’s Citizenship Raises Questions About Naturalization Process, supra note 207. To get a green card, and
250
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naturalization generally needs to be a permanent resident for only five years
and present in the United States for thirty months out of those five years;252 if
the applicant’s spouse is a U.S. citizen residing in the United States, she must
be a permanent resident for only three years and present in the United States
for eighteen months;253 and if the applicant’s spouse is a U.S. citizen employed
by the U.S. government and stationed abroad, “[n]o specific period as a
permanent resident . . . [or of] physical presence in the United States is
required.”254 Under certain circumstances, the child of a U.S. citizen may be
naturalized as a U.S. citizen, if that applicant was born abroad, before ever
residing in the United States.255 It is entirely conceivable that a naturalized
U.S. citizen will have spent eighteen months or less at the time of application
for naturalization, with the naturalization process taking an additional four
months.256
In cases heard by the Claims Tribunal, late naturalization (i.e.,
naturalization after the Islamic Revolution but before the signing of the Claims
Settlement Declaration) was not a conclusive bar to a finding of dominant and
effective U.S. nationality.257 But in cases where the Claims Tribunal found in
favor of dominant U.S. nationality for a dual citizen who had undergone late
naturalization, the individual typically had resided in the United States for an
extended period of time prior to naturalization.258
thus qualify for permanent residency, applicants “generally need a sponsor—a relative, spouse or employer.”
Id.
252 Path to U.S. Citizenship, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/
menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=86bd6811264a3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aR
CRD&vgnextchannel=86bd6811264a3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD (last updated June 8, 2011).
253 Naturalization for Spouses of U.S. Citizens, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.
gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=a0ffa3ac86aa3210VgnVCM
100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=a0ffa3ac86aa3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD (last updated
Oct. 17, 2011).
254 Id.
255 Biological or Adopted Children Residing Outside the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=
8554a3ac86aa3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=8554a3ac86aa3210VgnVCM100000b9
2ca60aRCRD (last updated Apr. 7, 2011).
256 Bomb Suspect’s Citizenship Raises Questions About Naturalization Process, supra note 207. But see
USCIS Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP.INFO, http://www.uscitizenship.info/ins-citizenship-process.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2011) (saying it takes an additional five months to more than two years).
257 Bederman, supra note 127, at 127.
258 See, e.g., Malek v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 19 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 48 (1988) (describing the case
of Reza Said Malek, who resided in the United States for approximately fourteen years prior to his “late
naturalization” as a U.S. citizen); Hemmat v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 129, 132
(1989) (describing the case of Nahid Hemmat Danielpour, who immigrated to the United States from Iran
approximately twenty-one years before her “late naturalization” as a U.S. citizen).
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The United States requires that naturalized citizens, as part of the process
of naturalization, pledge allegiance to the United States; but the United States
does not require an individual to renounce citizenship of her country of
birth.259 Thus, if a modern tribunal were to follow the Claims Tribunal’s
treatment in cases like Danielpour and Malek, a naturalized U.S. citizen who
has not resided in the United States for an extended period of time, and who
does not explicitly renounce her original citizenship upon U.S. naturalization,
risks the label of dominant and effective nationality of the foreign country (at
least during the initial portion of her U.S. citizenship).
It is unclear at which point, or after how many years of permanent
residency in the United States, a naturalized U.S. citizen will be considered to
have adequately integrated into American society and to have familiarized
herself with American culture so as to predominate over her foreign
nationality, as required by the Claims Tribunal in Danielpour.260 But if
Danielpour were strictly followed, a newly naturalized U.S. citizen who has
resided in the United States for only about eighteen months or less would not
be a dominant American national. It appears that the only way for a newly
naturalized U.S. citizen to assure herself of immediate dominant and effective
U.S. nationality is to explicitly renounce her foreign citizenship.261
This precedent may prove problematic to newly naturalized U.S. citizens—
dual nationals, on account of retaining their foreign citizenship while acquiring
U.S. citizenship—whom the U.S. government accuses of terrorism-related
offenses. At the time of his arrest in May 2010, Faisal Shahzad had been a
naturalized U.S. citizen for little more than a year.262 In Shahzad’s case, for
example, the decade that the thirty-year-old263 had spent living in the United
States prior to his naturalization would probably have been enough time to

259 US State Department Services Dual Nationality, supra note 25 (“U.S. law does not . . . require a
person [being naturalized as a U.S. citizen] to choose one citizenship or another . . . . [D]ual nationals owe
allegiance to both the United States and the foreign country.”).
260 See Danielpour v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 118 (1989).
261 “Information on losing foreign citizenship can be obtained from the foreign country’s embassy and
consulates in the United States. Americans can renounce U.S. citizenship in the proper form at U.S. embassies
and consulates abroad.” US State Department Services Dual Nationality, supra note 25.
262 Bomb Suspect’s Citizenship Raises Questions About Naturalization Process, supra note 207. Shahzad
“became a U.S. citizen in April 2009. He first entered the United States on a student visa in the late 1990s, was
granted a special work visa a few years later and obtained a green card in 2006 after his wife, an apparent U.S.
citizen, petitioned on his behalf.” Id.
263 Peter Finn et al., Feds Arrest N.Va. Man in D.C. Metro Bomb Plot, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2010, 12:03
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/27/AR2010102704857.html.
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familiarize himself with American culture under Danielpour’s standard.264 But
it is easy to imagine a situation arising in the future where a dual citizen
accused of a terrorism-related offense will have been, like Shahzad, a newly
naturalized U.S. citizen but who, unlike Shahzad, will have spent only a short
amount of time residing in the United States prior to naturalization. In such a
case, a court may hold that the individual should be labeled a dominant
national of the country of her foreign citizenship as a matter of procedure,
under Danielpour’s standard, without even needing to consider the factors
enumerated in the A/18 Decision.
Is it fair that a newly naturalized U.S. citizen may not be considered a
dominant U.S. citizen until she either: (1) has formally renounced her foreign
citizenship (which itself is not a requirement of U.S. citizenship), or (2) has
resided in the United States for an extended period of time? It may feel a bit
unfair to the individual, but this approach remains a perfectly reasonable one
for a court to take.
The body of customary international law precedent that establishes the
dominant nationality approach to treatment of dual citizens is underscored by
the search for an individual’s “genuine link” to one country.265 When given the
authority to determine an individual’s predominant citizenship out of two
particular countries, a court is reasonable to require that the individual live in a
country for a certain length of time before she is considered to have firmly
integrated into its culture and society. Of course, there are immigrants to the
United States who may live decades in the United States without ever learning
so much as the English language; but the length of time that those individuals
have lived in the United States at least puts them in position for a court to
apply the A/18 Decision’s multi-tiered test.
Adoption of this approach does not lead to the creation of naturalized
citizens as “second-class citizens,” as was contemplated by the Supreme Court
in Schneider v. Rusk.266 In Schneider, the Court held that in the context of the
case, the U.S. government could not strip a naturalized citizen of her U.S.
citizenship.267 However, that decision has no bearing on the examination of an
264 This is despite the fact that after his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, Shahzad traveled to Pakistan,
where he stayed for several months and where he allegedly received bomb-making training. American Who
Recently Visited Pakistan Eyed in Times Square Bomb Plot, FOX NEWS (May 3, 2010), http://www.foxnews.
com/politics/2010/05/03/officials-reportedly-foreign-plot-times-square-car-bomb.
265 See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 4, 7 (1955).
266 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 167 (1964); see also supra note 210 and accompanying text.
267 Schneider, 377 U.S. at 168–69.
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individual’s cultural integration into society where a court must determine the
predominant nationality of a dual citizen. The holding in Schneider, and the
Court’s fear of creating second-class citizens, is limited to threats of or
attempts to strip a U.S. citizen of her citizenship entirely.268
Finally, any potential unfairness to a naturalized citizen is outweighed by
the fact that there is a simple preventative remedy: upon naturalization as a
U.S. national, an individual may expressly renounce her foreign citizenship.
Once she relinquishes her dual citizenship and is a citizen only of the United
States, an individual entirely removes the dilemma caused by dual citizenship,
and the issue of determining dominant and effective nationality becomes moot.
This easy fix may be similarly adopted by naturalized citizens facing trials at
home in Europe or elsewhere abroad.
IV. THE AL-AULAQI AFFAIR AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF APPLICATION OF THE
DOCTRINE OF DOMINANT AND EFFECTIVE NATIONALITY
In the 2010 lawsuit to block the United States from targeting Anwar alAulaqi abroad, the district court’s opinion asked:
Can a U.S. citizen . . . use the U.S. judicial system to vindicate his
constitutional rights while simultaneously evading U.S. law
enforcement authorities, calling for “jihad against the West,” and
engaging in operational planning for an organization that has already
269
carried out numerous terrorist attacks against the United States?

In framing the issue this way, the court seems to have taken for granted the
assumption that al-Aulaqi, as a holder of U.S. citizenship, should be treated
just as if he did not hold citizenship with a foreign country—an assumption
that, if taken as fact, would probably lead to the inference that al-Aulaqi
deserves the full constitutional protections of the U.S. judiciary and due
process afforded to U.S. citizens.270 But under customary international law’s
rule of dominant and effective nationality, the court’s assumption was flawed.

268

See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Even CIA Director Leon Panetta seemed
to take al-Aulaqi’s U.S. citizenship for granted when he was quoted, in June 2010, as saying, al-Aulaqi “is a
terrorist and yes, he’s a U.S. citizen, but he is first and foremost a terrorist and we’re going to treat him like a
terrorist.” Perez, supra note 1.
270 Suzanne Ito, ACLU Lens: American Citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi Killed Without Judicial Process, AM.
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Sept. 30, 2011, 11:43 AM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/aclu-lensamerican-citizen-anwar-al-aulaqi-killed-without-judicial-process.
269
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Over the course of more than fifty years, international tribunals have
established the principle that when a dispute arises in which a tribunal’s
jurisdiction or the validity of a claim rests on the nation of citizenship of a dual
national, the tribunal must first, as a threshold matter, determine the dominant
and effective nationality of the individual.271 Here, al-Aulaqi’s dominant and
effective nationality—entirely ignored by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, and seemingly by commentators and media outlets in the
wake of al-Aulaqi’s death—is of the greatest importance to the validity of the
claim. If the court had made the threshold determination that al-Aulaqi was a
“dominant and effective” Yemeni national, why should he even be entitled to
the full Constitutional protections afforded to U.S. citizens? Quite simply, he
should not have been entitled to such protections.
Had the court allowed the al-Aulaqi lawsuit to proceed, rather than
dismissed it based on lack of standing and the political question doctrine,
customary international law dictates that the court should have first determined
al-Aulaqi’s dominant and effective nationality. Guided by the body of
international case law, largely derived from litigation under the Iran–United
States Claims Tribunal, as a source of precedent, the court should have
engaged in a factual analysis to determine al-Aulaqi’s effective nationality at
the time that the claim arose. In doing so, the court would test, as a threshold
matter, the validity of the claim’s underlying assumption that al-Aulaqi
deserves the full protections of U.S. citizenship.
A. The “Relevant Period”
Because al-Aulaqi was born with dual citizenship, rather than having been
born a citizen of one nation and later naturalized as a citizen of another (as was
the case with many of the cases in which the Claims Tribunal adopted a wider
notion of the “relevant period”),272 one might distinguish al-Aulaqi’s case from
those of the Claims Tribunal and argue that the “relevant period” should be as
simple as looking at the period surrounding the time his claim arose. In the
case of al-Aulaqi, it would appear that the claim arose as early as late 2009,
during which time al-Aulaqi is accused of participating in or aiding the

271 See, e.g., Iran–United States, Case No. A/18, 5 Iran–U.S Cl. Trib. Rep. 251 (1984); Mergé Case (U.S.
v. It.), 14 R.I.A.A. 236 (It.–U.S. Conciliation Comm’n 1955); Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 4,
4 (1995).
272 See, e.g., Perry-Rohani v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 194 (1989); Malek v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 194 (1989); Bederman, supra note 127, at 125.
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separate attacks by Hasan and Abdulmutallab,273 or early 2010, when it is
believed that al-Aulaqi first appeared on the U.S. government’s “kill list.”274
However, customary international law precedent suggests a somewhat
wider view of the relevant period. It is unlikely that al-Aulaqi’s case can be
wholly distinguished from those of the Claims Tribunal by the mere fact that
al-Aulaqi was born with dual citizenship, rather than having had acquired dual
citizenship through naturalization later in life. Thus, if the al-Aulaqi Case had
moved beyond procedural hurdles, and the court were to follow the practices of
the chambers of the Claims Tribunal, circumstance would demand a more
nuanced approach to dominant and effective nationality; the relevant period of
inquiry would extend to al-Aulaqi’s entire life.
B. Timeline of al-Aulaqi During the “Relevant Period”
Anwar al-Aulaqi was born in Las Cruces, New Mexico, in 1971 to Yemeni
parents.275 Because he was born on U.S. soil, and because his parents were
citizens of Yemen, al-Aulaqi was born holding dual citizenship. Al-Aulaqi’s
family returned to Yemen when he was seven years old,276 but al-Aulaqi
returned to the United States to study civil engineering at Colorado State
University in 1991.277 Peculiarly, despite his family’s relative wealth, alAulaqi falsely claimed that he was born in Yemen, rather than the United
States, in order to receive “$20,000 in scholarship money from a U.S.
government program” for which, as a U.S. citizen (even as a dual citizen), he
should not have been eligible.278 During college, al-Aulaqi was elected

273 Miller & Hsu, supra note 61; Meek, supra note 67. The U.S. government generally cites al-Aulaqi’s
alleged participation in these attacks as the driving force behind its authorizing the targeted killing of alAulaqi. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 3.
274 Shane, A Legal Debate, supra note 38.
275 Murphy, supra note 62. At the time of his birth, al-Aulaqi’s parents were graduate students at New
Mexico State University. Catherine Herridge, Radical Muslim Cleric Lied To Qualify for U.S.-Funded College
Scholarship, FOX NEWS (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/04/12/radical-muslim-cleric-liedqualify-funded-college-scholarship. Al-Aulaqi’s father first came to the United States as a Fulbright Scholar in
the late 1960s. Paula Newton, CNN Exclusive: Al-Awlaki’s Father Says Son Is ‘Not Osama Bin Laden,’ CNN
(Jan. 10, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-10/world/yemen.al.awlaki.father_1_awlaki-qaeda-yemeniofficials.
276 Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61, at 2; Imam in Fort Hood Case Born in New Mexico, UNITED
PRESS INT’L (Nov. 11, 2009, 6:34 PM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2009/11/11/Imam-in-Fort-Hoodcase-born-in-New-Mexico/UPI-43701257982479.
277 Herridge, supra note 275; Raghavan, supra note 61, at 1.
278 Herridge, supra note 275; Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61, at 2.
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president of his school’s Muslim Student Association, and he discovered a
knack for preaching at his local Islamic Center.279
In 1994, after receiving his Bachelor of Science degree, al-Aulaqi “married
a cousin from Yemen, . . . left behind engineering, and took a part-time job as
imam at the Denver Islamic Society.”280 Two years later, al-Aulaqi moved to
San Diego, where he earned a Master of Arts in Educational Leadership from
San Diego State University, while at the same time serving as one of the
imams at San Diego’s Rabat mosque.281 Starting in 2000, al-Aulaqi began
recording a series of highly popular boxed sets of audio CDs devoted to the life
of Muhammad, as well as the lesser prophets of Islam.282 Al-Aulaqi left San
Diego in mid-2000, and by early 2001 had relocated to northern Virginia,283
where he served as an imam at the Dar al-Hijra mosque.284 While living in
Virginia, he spent two semesters pursuing a doctorate degree in Human
Resource Development at George Washington University.285 Al-Aulaqi left the
United States in 2002 and lived in Britain for two years, before moving to
Yemen in 2004 to preach and study.286
In mid-2006, al-Aulaqi was imprisoned by Yemeni authorities after he
intervened in a tribal dispute.287 The director of U.S. national intelligence “told
Yemeni officials that the United States did not object to his
detention . . . . But by the end of 2007, American officials, some of whom were
disturbed at the imprisonment without charges of a [U.S.] citizen, signaled that
they no longer insisted on [al-Aulaqi’s] incarceration, and he was released.”288
In response to increasing pressure from the United States after the foiled
mail bomb plot in late 2010, Yemeni authorities put al-Aulaqi on trial in
absentia, along with his cousin, as codefendants in the trial of another man,

279

Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61, at 2.
Id. at 3.
281 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 66, at 229; Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61, at 3.
282 Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61, at 3. Although they deal with teachings of Islam, “[t]he recordings
appear free of obvious radicalism.” Id.
283 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 66, at 221.
284 Id. at 229.
285 Katie Rooney, Ex-student and Chaplain Tied to 9/11 Hijackers in Report, GW HATCHET (Sept. 6,
2005),
http://www.gwhatchet.com/home/index.cfm?event=displayArticle&ustory_id=0c121487-eaa2-4bb2a14d-08d373e149a4. During this time, al-Aulaqi “also served as the chaplain for [George Washington
University’s] Muslim Student Association.” Id.
286 Murphy, supra note 62; Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61, at 5.
287 Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61, at 5.
288 Id. at 6.
280
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Hisham Assem, who was “accused of killing a Frenchman in an October 6[,
2010,] attack at an oil firm compound” in Yemen.289 The prosecution alleged
that al-Aulaqi’s cousin had put Assem “indirectly in e-mail contact” with alAulaqi leading up to Assem’s attack,290 and that al-Aulaqi “repeatedly
‘encouraged’” Assem to carry out the attack.291 After al-Aulaqi failed to appear
for the start of his trial in early November 2010, the presiding Yemeni judge
ordered al-Aulaqi to be “arrested by force, dead or alive.”292
Government officials believe that al-Aulaqi remained in hiding in Yemen,
where he continued to play an active role in fighting against the West and
repeatedly issued videos online that call on Muslims, particularly Muslim
Americans, to kill Americans.293 On September 30, 2011, after three weeks of
tracking him, U.S. counterterrorism forces killed al-Aulaqi in northern
Yemen.294
C. Application of the Relevant Factors to al-Aulaqi
Nottebohm, the Mergé Claim, and the A/18 Decision each list a number of
relevant factors that a court should consider in determining an individual’s
dominant and effective nationality.295 These factors, as identified in the A/18
Decision, include “habitual residence, center of interest, family ties,
participation in public life, and other evidence of attachment.”296 In some way,
each of the factors mentioned in A/18 Decision is problematic.297 Yet despite
the complicated issues each may raise, these factors are supported by older
customary international law precedent, in which courts considered similar
factors and looked for an individual’s “genuine link” to one country more than
another.298 Just as they were applied by the Claims Tribunal, these relevant
289 Worth, supra note 83; Yemen Charges U.S.-Born Radical Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, supra note 85;
Yemen Puts Preacher al Awlaki on Trial in His Absence, NATIONAL (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.thenational.
ae/news/worldwide/middle-east/yemen-puts-preacher-al-awlaki-on-trial-in-his-absence.
290 Yemen Charges U.S.-Born Radical Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, supra note 85.
291 Jeralyn, supra note 85.
292 Yemen Orders Arrest of U.S.-Born Radical Cleric Awlaki, FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 6, 2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/11/06/yemen-orders-arrest-born-radical-cleric-awlaki.
293 Judge Tosses Targeted-Killing Case of Cleric, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.
newsmax.com/Newsfront/ClericLawsuit/2010/12/07/id/379213.
294 Al Qaeda’s Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in Yemen, supra note 79.
295 See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 4, 7 (1955); Case No. A/18, 5 Iran–U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 251 (1984); Mergé Case (U.S. v. It.), 14 R.I.A.A. 236 (It.–U.S. Conciliation Comm’n 1955).
296 Case No. A/18, 5 Iran–U.S Cl. Trib. Rep. 251.
297 Bederman, supra note 127, at 129. For discussion of the problems raised by each factor, see id. at 129–
34.
298 See, e.g., Nottebohm, 1953 I.C.J. at 7; Mergé Case, 14 R.I.A.A. at 236.
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factors should have been considered by the District Court for the District of
Columbia (had the claim been a justiciable issue) in determining, as a threshold
matter, al-Aulaqi’s dominant and effective nationality.
Before proceeding, it is worth mention that if the relevant period were 2009
to September 2011 (or, at the time of the lawsuit, late 2010), it would be clear
that al-Aulaqi was a dominant and effective Yemeni national. He was believed
to have resided in Yemen during the entirety of this period,299 his family and
cultural ties continued to lie in Yemen,300 and it is arguable that the ways in
which al-Aulaqi had disassociated himself with the United States during this
period, by encouraging and participating in repeated attacks against the United
States, serve as “other evidence of attachment” to Yemen, rather than to the
United States.301
In keeping with general practice of the Claims Tribunal, however, the
relevant period should include al-Aulaqi’s entire lifetime. With this in mind,
al-Aulaqi’s predominant nationality becomes less clear. The “habitual
residence” factor is a fairly straightforward examination,302 although in alAulaqi’s case, it does not suggest dominant nationality one way or the other. It
is difficult to view the other factors of consideration—“center of interest,
family ties, participation in public life, and other evidence of attachment”303—
entirely separate from one another because there is significant overlap among
them, but it is worth attempting to do so in an effort to stay clear and thorough.
Ultimately, their amalgamation probably weighs in favor of dominant Yemeni
citizenship; thus, even when viewing the relevant period as al-Aulaqi’s entire
lifetime, an examination would most likely result once again in a finding that
al-Aulaqi was a dominant Yemeni citizen.
1. Habitual Residence
An individual’s “habitual residence” is a straightforward test, but in alAulaqi’s case, a lifetime habitual residence is difficult to ascertain. The

299

Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61, at 5.
See, e.g., id. at 3.
301 See infra Part IV.C.5. There is no clear precedent that outward antagonism toward one of an
individual’s dual nationalities is a factor in determination dominant and effective nationality under the
doctrine. On the other hand, also consider the fact Yemeni officials prosecuted al-Aulaqi and issued a warrant
to catch him “dead or alive”; it is plausible that al-Aulaqi held disdain for the Yemeni government (though
perhaps not its people and culture) as well.
302 Bederman, supra note 127, at 130.
303 Case No. A/18, 5 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251 (1984).
300
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language of the A/18 Decision diligently avoids any mention of the Anglo–
American concept of domicile, which looks closely at an individual’s intent,
and instead develops a more mechanical test which links an individual with a
particular jurisdiction.304 In cases heard by the Claims Tribunal, determination
of habitual residence connoted “a fairly mechanical determination of where the
claimant had been living during the ‘relevant period.’”305
By the time of his death, al-Aulaqi had resided in both the United States
and Yemen for approximately twenty years each;306 so even a mechanical
measure fails to clear up ambiguity over al-Aulaqi’s habitual residence in
determining his dominant nationality. One can point to the U.S. Department of
State website, which explains that “[t]he country where a dual national is
located generally has a stronger claim to that person’s allegiance,”307 for
guidance; but this statement of principle is not made within the clear context of
the dominant and effective nationality doctrine, so may garner little weight. So
although al-Aulaqi’s more recent residence was within Yemen (although his
exact location was unclear for quite some time),308 this, too, may be of little
consequence to the court’s determination. Where an individual’s habitual
residence—or any factor, for that matter—is unclear, a tribunal should defer to
other considerations that demonstrate dominant nationality.309 In al-Aulaqi’s
case, the lack of a clear habitual residence simply affords greater weight to
each of the other factors.
2. Center of Interests
The A/18 Decision’s mention of center of interests “refers plainly to
economic interests and financial ties to one country or the other.”310 In cases
before the Claims Tribunal, this factor was particularly useful in determining
the dominant citizenship of a claimant who owned a business in Iran that
304 Bederman, supra note 127, at 129. However, “there is no agreement about what is meant by ‘habitual
residence.’ The most that can be said is that it usually refers to the fact of an individual’s habitation in a
particular place, and not to any intention to make that a permanent abode.” Id. at 129–30.
305 Id. at 127.
306 Al-Aulaqi lived in the United States from 1971 to 1978, and again from 1991 to 2002; he resided in
Yemen from 1978 to 1991, and again from 2004 to 2011. The Anwar al-Awlaki Timeline, SETH HETTENA,
http://awlaki.sethhettena.com (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
307 US State Department Services Dual Nationality, supra note 25.
308 Newton, supra note 275, at 1. In January 2010, Yemeni officials claimed that al-Aulaqi was “hiding
out in the southern mountains of Yemen with al Qaeda,” while Dr. Nasser al-Aulaqi, Anwar al-Aulaqi’s father,
claimed that his son “is not hiding with al Qaeda.” Id.
309 See supra Part III.D.1.
310 Bederman, supra note 127, at 130.
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suffered injury as a result of the Iranian revolution, or where an American
woman married an Iranian man but kept money or investments in American
institutions.
Al-Aulaqi presents a different story. He did not own or operate a business
in any traditional sense, and it is difficult to find any publicly available
information on his finances. As “center of interests” was contemplated by the
A/18 Decision alone, it would be quite challenging to determine al-Aulaqi’s
center of interests.
In practice, however, the Claims Tribunal came to extend this factor to
include a consideration not even mentioned in the A/18 Decision: the notion of
an individual’s cultural integration into one or the other nation’s society.311 To
this end, al-Aulaqi’s center of interests probably fell more with Yemen than
with the United States.
Al-Aulaqi held significant interests with Yemen. He lived in Yemen from
the time he was seven years old until he left for college,312 formative years in
any person’s life. When al-Aulaqi did come to the United States to study, he
used his Yemeni citizenship to obtain scholarship money.313 Both of alAulaqi’s parents were born in Yemen, his wife is Yemeni, his children have
grown up in Yemen, and he spent his final years being hidden by extended
family members in southern Yemen.314 Even when living in the United States,
as a student and an imam, al-Aulaqi continued to identify with Islamic culture,
if not with Yemen itself,315 and when he fled the United States, he returned
home to Yemen.
At times, it appeared that al-Aulaqi had legitimately integrated into
American life. While living in the United States, he attended school and
became a community leader in each city in which he lived, he expanded his

311 Id. at 131. Though not specifically mentioned in the A/18 Decision, this notion was “perhaps hinted at
in A/18’s mention of ‘other evidence of attachment.’” Id.
312 Herridge, supra note 275.
313 Id.
314 See Oliver Holmes, Why Hasn’t Yemen Hunted Down Anwar al-Awlaki?, TIME (Nov. 9, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2030277,00.html.
315 One might argue that al-Aulaqi’s integration into American society represented, for the most part,
involvement with specific minority communities (i.e., Muslim Americans), rather than mainstream America,
whereas his integration into Yemeni society was more in line with mainstream Yemeni culture. However, such
an argument would be unfair, and perhaps inaccurate, because (1) the Claims Tribunal did not look at whether
an individual integrated only with a nation’s “mainstream” society, and (2) the United States, more so than
almost any other country, prides itself on welcoming all people, as a world melting pot.
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influence outside of the communities in which he lived by distributing audio
recordings, he brought his wife to the United States, and he remained in the
United States for eleven years (after having already spent the first seven years
of his life in the United States).316 Nearly a decade after leaving the United
States, al-Aulaqi recalled his experiences of American daily life in his online
sermons.317 Al-Aulaqi spoke fluent English, without a foreign accent.318 It is
obvious that, even after leaving the United States, al-Aulaqi continued to exert
influence over at least some Americans.319 Al-Aulaqi frequently used the
internet to communicate with American Muslims both as a group, through
online sermons320 and writings,321 and as individuals.322 For the better part of
the relevant period of inquiry, al-Aulaqi remained at least somewhat integrated
into American society.
Taken as a whole, al-Aulaqi’s center of interests probably aligned more
with Yemen than with the United States. This conclusion may be reached in
large part because of his substantial family ties in Yemen and the fact that he
316 See Aamer Madhani, Cleric al-Awlaki Dubbed ‘bin Laden of the Internet,’ USA TODAY (Aug. 24,
2010, 8:32 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-08-25-1A_Awlaki25_CV_N.htm.
317 Anwar al-Awlaki, Message to the American People, DAILY MOTION, at 0’55”–1’23” (Aug. 27, 2010)
[hereinafter Message to the American People], http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xelcve_message-to-theamerican-people-anwa_people (recording al-Aulaqi in an incredibly collegial message to “the American
people” in recalling the ease of domestic airline travel before September 11, 2001).
318 See, e.g., id.
319 To recognize the scope of his contact and influence within the United States, one need look no further
than al-Aulaqi’s relationship with Hassan or with Shahzad, each of whom was living in the United States at the
time of contact with al-Aulaqi.
320 See, e.g., Message to the American People, supra note 317, at 10’55”–11’15”. In this online sermon,
easily accessible to Americans through websites like Daily Motion, al-Aulaqi said,

To the Muslims in America, I have this to say: How can your conscience allow you to live in
peaceful coexistence with the nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed
against your own brothers and sisters? How can you have your loyalty to a government that is
leading the war against Islam and Muslims?
Id.
321 See, e.g., Miller & Samuels, supra note 78. His magazine, Inspire, “offers a canny blend of photos,
feature stories, insider details . . . and verse-quoting theological justifications for terrorist attacks, all of it
calculated to appeal to American Muslims who grew up on glossy magazines like Details and GQ.” Id.
322 See, e.g., Brian Ross & Rhonda Schwartz, Major Hasan’s E-Mail: ‘I Can’t Wait to Join You’ in
Afterlife, ABC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/major-hasans-mail-wait-join-afterlife/
story?id=9130339 (“United States Army Major Nidal Hasan told a radical cleric considered by authorities to
be an al-Qaeda recruiter, ‘I can’t wait to join you’ in the afterlife, according to an American official with top
secret access to 18 e-mails exchanged between Hasan and the cleric, Anwar al Awlaki, over a six month period
between Dec. 2008 and June 2009.”); Jason Ryan, Texas Terror Sting: Feds Say Suspect Was in Contact with
Anwar al-Awlaki, ABC NEWS (June 3, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/texas-terror-sting-feds-barry-walterbujol-contact/story?id=10821525 (“Barry Walter Bujol, 29, allegedly was in contact with Awlaki going back
to 2008, when he gained the attention of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force in Houston.”).
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apparently felt safe in Yemen. Little is known of al-Aulaqi’s financial interests,
but it seems a reasonable assumption that he was more economically connected
with Yemen; this inference is supported by the fact that even when attending
school in the United States, he received significant scholarship money by
virtue of his Yemeni citizenship.323 And by many accounts, al-Aulaqi more
recently had fully integrated into Yemeni society, having become so popular in
the southern region of the nation that, until he left for the North, the Yemeni
government lacked the political clout to hunt him down.324
Undoubtedly, one cannot say that al-Aulaqi’s center of interests lay more
with the United States than with Yemen. On one end of the spectrum of
possibility, his center of interests lay with Yemen; at the other end, his interests
were shared equally between the two. Therefore, it is probably reasonable to
suggest that al-Aulaqi’s center of interests favor dominant Yemeni citizenship.
3. Family Ties
Al-Aulaqi’s family ties suggest dominant Yemeni citizenship. Even while
living in the United States, al-Aulaqi married a woman from Yemen, with
whom he had three children,325 who themselves have spent the better part of
their lives in Yemen. Al-Aulaqi’s family comes from a powerful tribe in
southern Yemen, and “has many connections to the government of Yemen,
including the country’s prime minister, who is a relative of the [al-Aulaqi]
family.”326 There have even been some claims that al-Aulaqi, while hiding in
Yemen, was protected by his tribe.327 Al-Aulaqi’s family ties heavily favor
dominant Yemeni citizenship.
4. Participation in Public Life
Having interpreted “center of interests” to include the integration of an
individual into society, one might think that the chambers of the Claims
Tribunal left little need for additional examination of “participation in public

323

Herridge, supra note 275.
Holmes, supra note 314 (“[F]or many Yemenis, [al-Aulaqi] is . . . an Al Capone, a known outlaw
traveling with impunity and some social cachet.”).
325 Warren Richey, Anwar al-Awlaki: ACLU Wants Militant Cleric Taken off U.S. ‘Kill List,’ CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/0831/Anwar-al-Awlaki-ACLUwants-militant-cleric-taken-off-US-kill-list.
326 Newton, supra note 275, at 1.
327 Id. (quoting al-Aulaqi’s father, who stated, “[Al-Aulaqi] is not hiding with al Qaeda; our tribe is
protecting him right now”).
324
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life.” Although they likely overlap in most cases, the two factors are distinct.
The cases in which these two factors may lead to contradictory conclusions of
dominant citizenship are those in which the individual in question has lived in
hiding or in exile.328
By all accounts, al-Aulaqi was quite active in public life during his years
living in the United States; not only did he attend American schools, but he
also became a leader in student organizations and his local Muslim
communities. Likewise, by some accounts, al-Aulaqi became active in public
life after returning to Yemen, even though he was “in hiding” for much of that
period.329 In the United States, al-Aulaqi became a community leader in each
place he lived;330 and in Yemen, he was a community and tribal leader, so
active in public life that his intervention in a tribal dispute got him arrested in
2006.331
One might argue that because al-Aulaqi was either imprisoned or in hiding
for the majority of his life after returning to Yemen in 2004, he was not as
actively participatory in public life as he had been in the United States; and
even more so, to a certain degree, that al-Aulaqi remained active in American
public life through use of the internet, even after his departure from the United
States in 2002.332 Following his arrest and subsequent release from prison, alAulaqi retained a relatively low profile within Yemen (at least enough of one
to continue to evade arrest by government authorities), while his public
persona within the United States experienced significant growth. Ultimately, it
is possible that al-Aulaqi’s participation in public life favors dominant
American citizenship. However, because the degree of his participation in

328 Although he lacks dual nationality, consider as an illustrative example the Dalai Lama, who has been
in exile from Tibet for fifty-two years. By nature of his exile and China’s tight control over communications
within Tibet, the Dalai Lama probably has not been very active in Tibetan public life throughout his lifetime.
Yet at the same time, it is quite possible that his center of interests have remained with Tibet throughout this
relevant period. See 1959: Dalai Lama Escapes to India, BBC NEWS, (Mar. 31, 2011), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/31/newsid_2788000/2788343.stm.
329 See Holmes, supra note 314. However, little is known about his participation in public life in Yemen
before coming to the United States in 1991.
330 See, e.g., Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61, at 2.
331 Id. at 5.
332 In addition to individualized communications with Muslim Americans, al-Aulaqi even made attempts
to reach out to the greater American public. See, e.g., Message to the American People, supra note 317, at
0’40”–1’55” (recording al-Aulaqi in an online sermon, which begins, “To the American people I say: Do you
remember the good old days, when Americans were enjoying the blessings of security and peace? When the
word ‘terrorism’ was rarely invoked, and you were oblivious to any threats?” and then discusses the hassles of
commercial air travel in the United States, both past and present).
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Yemeni public life is for the most part unknown, the strength of this factor in
support of American dominancy is, at best, tenuous.
5. Other Evidence of Attachment
The greatest hurdle in determining al-Aulaqi’s cultural affiliation and
“other evidence of attachment” is that he did not clearly identify himself with
any one country—rather, he culturally identified himself mainly with the
religion of Islam and its people, wherever they may be located. Al-Aulaqi
endeavored to associate more substantially with Muslims, as a group, than with
the people of any one nation in particular. His rhetoric touched on issues
involving Yemen,333 but no more than it discussed the plight of Muslims (and
the carnage of Americans) in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and within the
United States.
Though it does not strip him of American citizenship entirely, the fact that
al-Aulaqi showed disassociation with the United States may be enough to tilt
this factor in favor of al-Aulaqi’s holding dominant Yemeni citizenship. In
considering the “habitual residence” factor, the Claims Tribunal generally held
that it was insufficient for individuals with residency in a third state “to show
that their dominant and effective nationality was not Iranian, but, rather, that it
was indisputably American.”334 It is unclear whether the Claims Tribunal
would also have established such a high burden with regard to cultural
affiliation; but even so, commentators suggest that this standard may have
asked too much.335
To be sure, prior to his departure from the United States in 2002, al-Aulaqi
would probably have been a dominant American citizen. In a January 2010
interview with CNN, al-Aulaqi’s father stated, “[My son] lived his life in
America, he’s an all-American boy. My son would love to go back to
America.”336 But in a recent online sermon, al-Aulaqi describes his former
attachment to, and subsequent fall-out, with the United States:
I, for one, was born in the [United States] and lived in the [United
States] for twenty-one years. America was my home. I was a
333 See, e.g., Message to the American People, supra note 317, at 9’25”–9’40” (“If George W. Bush is
remembered as being the President who got America stuck in Afghanistan and Iraq, it’s looking like Obama
wants to be remembered as the President who got America stuck in Yemen. Obama has already started his war
on Yemen.”).
334 Bederman, supra note 127, at 131.
335 Id.
336 Newton, supra note 275.
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preacher of Islam involved in non-violent Islamic activism. However,
with the American invasion of Iraq and continued U.S. aggression
against Muslims, I could not reconcile between living in the [United
States] and being a Muslim—and I eventually came to the conclusion
that jihad against America is binding upon myself, just as it is
337
binding on every other able Muslim.

He continues to say, in his message apparently directed toward the American
public, “It is true that we are facing the arsenal of the greatest army on earth
with our simple modest means, but victory is on our side . . . because there is a
difference between us and you.”338 Indeed, the tenor of al-Aulaqi’s “Message
to the American People” highlights a strong disconnect in his relationship to
the United States.
As apparent as his disdain for the United States may have been, al-Aulaqi’s
conduct is not enough to strip him of U.S. citizenship entirely. One might
argue that many of al-Aulaqi’s statements and conduct over the past few years
demonstrate his “intention” to give up U.S. citizenship; and in truth, a U.S.
citizen who “acquires a foreign citizenship by applying for it may lose U.S.
citizenship” if the person applies “for the foreign citizenship voluntarily, by
free choice, and with the intention to give up U.S. citizenship.”339 Even so, alAulaqi was never at risk of losing his U.S. citizenship outright, no matter how
damning his statements or conduct may appear, because he gained dual
citizenship “automatically” at birth. The U.S. State Department’s website
makes clear that a U.S. citizen “who is automatically granted another
citizenship does not risk losing U.S. citizenship.”340 Although al-Aulaqi’s
conduct over the past decade did not strip him of citizenship, his recent
exploits are probably enough to sway the other evidence of attachment factor
in favor of dominant Yemeni citizenship.
In addition, al-Aulaqi did show legitimate attachment to Yemen throughout
the relevant period of inquiry. While little is known about his formative years
in Yemen, a tribunal may reasonably assume that al-Aulaqi’s residence in
Yemen from ages seven to nineteen must have left him feeling some type of
attachment to the country. He used his Yemeni citizenship, and hid his
American citizenship, to obtain a college scholarship. While living in the
337

Message to the American People, supra note 317, at 6’19”–6’53”.
Id. at 7’33”–7’45”.
339 US State Department Services Dual Nationality, supra note 25. In such a case, “[i]ntent can be shown
by the person’s statements or conduct.” Id.
340 Id.
338
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United States, he chose to marry a Yemeni woman (although he did bring her
back to the United States with him). When he left the United States, al-Aulaqi
soon returned to Yemen, where he undoubtedly felt safe and welcome.341 AlAulaqi spoke both in English and in Arabic in his online sermons and
interviews. It is not known what language he primarily spoke at home, but if he
used Arabic at home, particularly while he was living in America (which is
probable, since his wife immigrated from Yemen), it would evidence
attachment to Yemen more than to the United States. And although al-Aulaqi
may, at times, have shown distaste for Yemeni politicians,342 he typically
spoke fondly of the Yemeni public, much more so than he did of its American
counterpart. Ultimately, A/18 Decision’s “other evidence of attachment” factor
should weigh in favor of al-Aulaqi holding dominant Yemeni citizenship.
D. Determination of al-Aulaqi’s Dominant and Effective Nationality
It is apparent that, throughout his lifetime, al-Aulaqi made an effort to take
advantage of his dual citizenship by using each one of his nationalities to his
advantage, whenever most convenient. For example, when coming to the
United States to attend college, al-Aulaqi used his Yemeni citizenship (and
withheld information about his U.S. citizenship) to obtain a $20,000
scholarship.343 Fifteen years later, when he was arrested and imprisoned by
Yemeni authorities, al-Aulaqi grew angry, on grounds that he held U.S.
citizenship, with the U.S. government because it did not immediately object to
his prolonged detention without charges; and he was quick to use the argument
that he, himself, was an American citizen as a rhetorical tool of influence over
his followers.344
An observer reasonably might recognize that al-Aulaqi considered himself
a citizen of the “world,” or a citizen of the “Islamic world,” more than a citizen
341 He was likely justified in feeling safe, considering the fact that the United States officially targeted
him for death for over a year, planned to spend up to $63 million in operations in Yemen in 2010, and only
found him in September 2011. Mark Landler, U.S. Has Few Resources To Face Threats in Yemen, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2010, at A9.
342 See, e.g., Message to the American People, supra note 317, at 10’03”–10’28” (“The corrupt Yemeni
government officials . . . are having a ball these days. . . . The Yemeni government officials are giving [the
United States] big promises and handing [the United States] big bills—welcome to the world of Yemeni
politicians.”).
343 Letter from Frank Wolf, U.S. Congressman, to Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir., FBI (May 24, 2010),
available at http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/376.pdf (“[I]t is my understanding that
Aulaqi fraudulently obtained more than $20,000 in federal scholarship funds reserved for foreign students for
which he was not eligible.”).
344 See Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61.

KANNOF GALLEYSFINAL2.DOC

2011]

3/21/2012 8:16 AM

DUELING NATIONALITIES

1427

either of Yemen or of the United States.345 Consider, for example, that in one
February 2011 audio message, al-Aulaqi criticized the U.S. government for
carrying out bomb strikes in Yemen and for oppressing WikiLeaks founder
Julian Assange, then criticized the Yemeni government for convicting a
journalist of helping al Qaeda and of cooperating with the U.S. government in
those strikes.346 Al-Aulaqi wrote and spoke as if he did so on behalf of
Muslims everywhere (even if, in reality, he spoke on behalf only of a relatively
small group of radical Muslims).347
In many ways, his public persona was reminiscent of those of Osama bin
Laden and other leaders of terrorist organizations.348 Terrorist organizations,
such as al Qaeda and AQAP, are typically borderless and, by definition,
illegitimate under international law; so perhaps a leader who feels more
married to his cause than to any one nation is an appropriate figurehead. Yet
even the most transnational of leaders must fall within the purview of the
reciprocal rights and duties of at least one nation.
Existing precedent does not firmly identify how much weight to give to
each of the A/18 Decision’s factors. Habitual residence tends to weigh heavily
in a tribunal’s determination, in part because it is such an objective measure;
but because al-Aulaqi split his residence nearly equally between the United
States and Yemen, the factor is of little guidance. Al-Aulaqi’s center of
interests either lay slightly with Yemen, or was about evenly split; and while
his participation in public life arguably lay slightly with the United States, it
most likely was about evenly split (or possibly even aligned slightly with
Yemen), too.
The strongest evidences of al-Aulaqi’s dominant citizenship are his family
ties and his “other evidence of attachment”—both of which favor dominant
Yemeni citizenship. Had the court in the al-Aulaqi Case proceeded beyond the
issues of justiciability, it should have found, before reaching a decision on the
merits, that al-Aulaqi was a dominant and effective Yemeni national. Only
after making this determination would the court have been in position to make
345 Nonetheless, a legitimately recognized concept of “world citizenship” does not exist under
international law, or under the municipal laws of any nation.
346 Anwar al-Awlaki Calls Yemenis To Back Journalist and al-Qaeda Expert, Abdu Elah Haidar, YEMEN
POST (Feb. 14, 2011, 9:40 PM), http://yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=3135.
347 See Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61.
348 Indeed, one article explains, “[i]n the West, [al-Aulaqi] is caricatured as a Yemeni Osama bin Laden,”
but notes that “for many Yemenis, [al-Aulaqi] is more of an Al Capone, a known outlaw traveling with
impunity and some social cachet.” Holmes, supra note 314.
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an appropriate and accurate ruling on the legality of the U.S. government’s
targeting of al-Aulaqi.
CONCLUSION
Just as the U.S. government can use the doctrine of dominant and effective
nationality to its benefit in justifying its targeting of al-Aulaqi, recognition of
the doctrine by domestic courts may prove an invaluable tool in the
government’s defense of targeting, detaining, or trying an individual in a way
that it may typically reserve for non-citizens. Although the doctrine is useful
only in cases where a targeted or detained individual holds dual citizenship,
this group is rather substantial because the West has seen a growing trend of
homegrown terrorism in recent years. With increasing accessibility to the
internet and other technology, coupled with anger over the continued U.S.
military presence in Muslim nations abroad, this trend is likely to continue into
the foreseeable future.
In applying the doctrine, customary international law precedent provides
some degree of guidance; and undoubtedly, as they apply the doctrine in more
and more instances, U.S. courts would fill in the gaps and add to existing
precedent as needed. But widespread adoption of the doctrine leads to another
underlying question: if domestic courts are tasked with determining, as a
threshold matter, the dominant nationality of a dual citizen before proceeding
to the merits of the case (if the individual’s state of citizenship has bearing on
the court’s jurisdiction or on the merits of the case), then what, if any, are the
benefits to dual citizenship?
Less-developed countries may benefit from embracing dual citizenship as a
means to boost the economy and encourage expatriated, former citizens to
return home.349 In early 2011, for example, senators in Liberia, a country that
has not traditionally allowed dual citizenship, introduced a bill to make dual
citizenship possible.350 The rationale behind the bill is that by granting dual
citizenship to 500,000 expatriated Liberians—many of whom have been
educated, are working, and are living in wealthy Western nations—the country
will encourage these former citizens to return home to bring professional skills,
economic growth, and other contributions to Liberia’s reconstruction.351 It is
conceivable that, for parallel reasons, other developing countries would benefit
349
350
351

See, e.g., Butty, supra note 229.
Id.
Id. Liberia is emerging from fourteen years of civil war. Id.
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from allowing dual citizenship. In a similar vein, even some wealthier nations
benefit from allowing dual citizenship in the form of the “law of return,” as a
means of enticing direct descendants of nationals of the home country, or
believers in the state religion, to repatriate.352
Because of the doctrine of dominant and effective nationality, individuals
who hold dual citizenship are provided few substantial benefits; even the
benefits to less-developed or “law of return” nations seem aimed at benefitting
the state itself more than any individual dual citizen.353 Yet despite the
potential conflicts caused by dual citizenship, dual nationals do enjoy a number
of “smaller” benefits: dual citizens can enjoy dual voting rights, cheaper (and
sometimes safer) travel, ease of being able to work and study overseas, and in
some cases, reduced tax burdens, expanded rights to property ownership, and
increased access to investment opportunities.354
Although individuals may enjoy the limited benefits of dual citizenship, the
pitfalls remain great. Individuals with dual citizenship may be denied certain
judicial protections, by virtue of the doctrine of dominant and effective
nationality, that they may have assumed they held. Dual nationals typically
lose the consular help of one country of citizenship when they visit the
other.355 Dual nationals may have difficulty bringing a claim against either of
their nations of citizenship, and in times of emergency, dual nationality may
limit the assistance that one of the nations of citizenship can provide to an
individual.356 Finally, with the benefits of a dual set of rights comes the
reciprocal dual set of duties. Establishing dominant citizenship in one country
does not necessarily relieve a dual citizen of her duties owed to the other; in
some cases, for example, dual nationals face conscription by one or both of
their nations of citizenship.357
352

See Citizenship, supra note 104; Acquisition of Israeli Nationality, supra note 104 (explaining that the
“law of return” grants every Jew the right to come to Israel and become an Israeli citizen); Italian Dual
Citizenship Requirements, supra note 104.
353 See Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 61.
354 Mark Bridge, Dual Status Can Be a Passport to New Riches, TIMES (London), May 31, 2008, at 6;
Dual Citizenship Benefits (and Pitfalls) for Bilinguals (and Others), BLOGGING ON BILINGUALISM (Mar. 30,
2010, 1:34 PM), http://bloggingonbilingualism.com/2010/03/30/dual-citizenship. For example, British citizens
cannot buy property in India, but Britain’s “‘persons of Indian origin’ . . . who enjoy certain benefits of
citizenship without full dual status, are free to buy there.” Bridge, supra.
355 Bridge, supra note 354.
356 US State Department Services Dual Nationality, supra note 25 (“Claims of other countries on dual
national U.S. citizens may conflict with U.S. law, and dual nationality may limit U.S. Government efforts to
assist citizens abroad.”).
357 See Bridge, supra note 354.
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For many of these reasons, the U.S. government discourages individuals
from keeping dual nationality; but it does continue to recognize the existence
of dual nationality, and allows its citizens to hold dual citizenship if they so
choose.358 In doing so, the U.S. government has put itself in a position to deny
dual nationals the full protections of U.S. citizenship in instances where it can
demonstrate that the individual is a dominant and effective foreign national.
The U.S. government would be wise to advocate that domestic courts take such
an approach because the doctrine is firmly grounded in preexisting customary
international law. In practice, invocation of the doctrine of dominant and
effective nationality could aid the government in its fight against terrorism by
giving the government greater discretionary authority in how it targets, detains,
and tries suspected terrorists who hold dual citizenship. Most significantly, this
tool may be particularly useful in combating a growing homegrown terrorist
threat; and in a “war” against a non-traditional enemy, and with no clear end in
sight, every little bit helps.
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